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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
On 28 May 2002, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
Russian Federation adopted a Declaration in Rome on “NATO-Russian Relations: A 
New Quality.”  The Declaration replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) with the 
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as the new venue for consultation, cooperation, joint 
decision and joint action.  This thesis analyzes the origins and prospects of the NRC.  It 
provides background on Moscow’s relations with NATO from 1990 to 1997.  It analyzes 
the PJC, which was established by the May 1997 Founding Act, notably with regard to 
the key events in the PJC’s history and its merits and shortcomings.  Although the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States led to a new era in NATO-
Russia relations, each side has pursued this new relationship because of its own motives.  
The thesis analyzes the Rome Declaration and discusses the key differences between the 
NATO-Russia Council and its predecessor, the PJC.  It also assesses the NRC’s progress 
to date and its visible and potential problems.  The thesis concludes that the prospects for 
the NATO-Russia Council depend in large part on the political will of the participating 
governments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 
ushered in a new era of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and Moscow.  Even prior to the Soviet collapse, at the Paris conference in 
November 1990 the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact declared that they no 
longer viewed each other as adversaries and that they intended to overcome the decades 
of mistrust and confrontation.  In May 1997, NATO and Russia formalized their new 
relationship with the endorsement of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation 
and Security.  NATO and Russia pledged better cooperation in an effort to build a lasting 
peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.  The Founding Act established the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as the venue for consultations and cooperation. 
NATO and Russia utilized the PJC primarily as a forum for dialogue.  In response 
to NATO’s March-June 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia, however, the Russians 
suspended their participation in the PJC until July 1999.  The Russians then limited the 
PJC agenda to the Balkan peacekeeping operations with Russian participation – the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo - until 
February 2000.   
After the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, NATO 
and Russia decided to deepen their cooperation.  In May 2002 they established a new 
venue known as the NATO-Russia Council. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the origins and prospects of the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC).  The thesis compares and contrasts the new NATO-Russia 
Council with its predecessor, the PJC, and considers whether the structural changes 
embodied in the NATO-Russia Council are sufficient to promote a better relationship 
between the parties.  In addition, this thesis identifies potential problems in the NATO-
Russia Council and, more important, in the foundations of the new NATO-Russia 
relationship – that is, the interests and intentions of the two parties. 
This topic is important because the events of the last century, including the two 
World Wars and the Cold War, illustrate the need for stability and security in the Euro-
1 
Atlantic area.  NATO and Russia have unique strategic roles in this region.  According to 
their own declarations, they face common challenges and share common responsibilities 
for the future of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
The thesis is based on primary and secondary sources.  The primary sources 
include the May 1997 Founding Act, the May 2002 Declaration on A New Quality of 
NATO-Russia Relations, and statements by NATO, NATO Member States, and the 
Russian government.  The secondary sources include works by political and military 
analysts in newspapers, professional journals, and other reports. 
The thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II examines the PJC from its 
inception in 1997 to its termination in 2002.  The chapter begins with background on 
Moscow’s relations with NATO and the West from 1990 to 1997.  This section provides 
a brief overview and analysis of Russia’s involvement in the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC), NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, the peacekeeping 
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina – including both the Implementation Force (IFOR) 
and SFOR, and the Bosnia Contact Group.  Although dialogue and cooperation did exist, 
NATO-Russia relations fell short of the aspirations articulated by NATO and Moscow.  
Given Russia’s unique strategic role in the Euro-Atlantic region and the post-Cold War 
issues of NATO’s new Strategic Concept and enlargement, both sides recognized the 
necessity to improve NATO-Russia relations.  The May 1997 Founding Act and the PJC 
were intended to facilitate consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. 
The chapter then examines the issues that influenced the signing of the Founding 
Act and provides an analysis of the completed document as well as of the key events in 
the PJC’s proceedings.  The PJC’s activities fall into four distinct periods:  from its 
inception in May 1997 to March 1999; the suspension of Russian participation from 
March to June 1999; the period of an agenda limited to SFOR and KFOR matters, from 
July 1999 to February 2000; and the period from February 2000 until its replacement in 
May 2002.  This chapter analyzes the successes and shortcomings of the Founding Act 
and the PJC throughout each of these periods. 
Chapter III discusses the origins of the NATO-Russia Council.  The chapter 
begins with an overview of Russia’s relations with the West when Vladimir Putin became 
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the acting President of Russia on 31 December 1999.  Although NATO-Russia relations 
were frigid at the onset of his presidency, Putin pursued a foreign and domestic policy 
agenda that envisioned Russia closely tied to the West. 
The next section of the chapter explains how the terrorist attacks against the 
United States on 11 September 2001 led to a new period of cooperation between Russia 
and the Allies.  Although the events of 11 September marked the turning point in better 
cooperation between the Allies and Russia, each side has pursued this new relationship 
because of its own motives.  The thesis analyzes the apparent motives of each of the 
parties.   
Chapter IV offers a detailed analysis of the NATO-Russia Council.  This chapter 
begins with a review of the Founding Act and the PJC.  It then discusses the issues that 
influenced the building of a new relationship.  The chapter examines the May 2002 Rome 
documents that established the Council.  The section then discusses the key differences 
between the PJC and its successor.  Although both forums were designed to provide an 
institution for consultation, cooperation, joint decision and joint action for NATO and 
Russia on nearly the same issues, the structure for their interactions includes some 
significant changes. 
The NATO-Russia Council will not meet in the PJC’s format of 19+1, whereby 
NATO member countries agreed on an Alliance position before presenting their 
consensus view to Russia.  The NATO-Russia Council will meet “at 20” – that is, Russia 
and the NATO member states will seek a consensus without the NATO countries having 
previously determined an Alliance policy.  Another significant difference is that the 
Secretary General of NATO will chair the NATO-Russia Council, in contrast with the 
“troika” arrangement for chairing PJC sessions.         
This chapter also provides an analysis of the NATO-Russia Council by assessing 
its progress to date and the visible and potential problems.  One provision that could be 
problematic in some circumstances is the “safeguard,” whereby any NATO Ally can 
remove an item from the NRC’s agenda.  Although early reports indicate that the new 
Council is proving to be successful, some analysts believe that problems are likely to 
surface as soon as the Council is confronted with a tough issue about which Russia and 
3 
the West have sharply different opinions.  Moreover, many analysts argue that for the 
new NATO-Russia Council to work effectively each side will have to put the past behind 
and exert the political will necessary to make this partnership successful.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the NATO-Russia Council’s prospects.  
The final chapter offers conclusions regarding the NATO-Russia Council.  This 
chapter synthesizes the key findings and presents judgments regarding the prospects for 
the NATO-Russia Council. 
4 
II. THE NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT AND THE 
PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL 
The events in 1989-91 that marked the end of the Cold War – the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Communist governments in East-Central 
Europe, the unification of Germany, and the disintegration of the Warsaw 
Pact and the Soviet Union – obliged the Allies to redefine NATO’s 
purposes and to endow it with new roles in addition to its traditional core 
missions of collective defense and dialogue with adversaries.1 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze one of the most significant new roles of 
the Alliance, namely dialogue and cooperation with Russia, the principal successor state 
of NATO’s Cold War adversary, the USSR.2  The chapter considers the development of 
the NATO-Russia relationship within the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) founded in 1997 
and why the PJC did not achieve the results desired by its architects.  The chapter 
discusses NATO-Russia relations from 1990 to 1997 and the origins of the 1997 
Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the 
Russian Federation.  The chapter examines the issues that influenced the signing of the 
Founding Act and Russia’s view of the document.  Furthermore, it examines some of the 
key events of the PJC’s history and analyzes its successes and failures.  Finally, the 
chapter reviews the events that contributed to the replacement of the PJC by the NATO-
Russia Council.  
A. POST-COLD WAR NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
At NATO’s July 1990 London Summit, Heads of State and Government from the 
member states of the Alliance offered a new era of relations with their Cold War 
adversaries.  The North Atlantic Council, in the words of its London Declaration, 
proposed to the member states of the Warsaw Pact “a joint declaration in which we 
solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries.” 3  In addition, the member states of the 
                                                 
1 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), p. 72. 
2 Ibid.  David S. Yost states that “These new roles can be defined and categorized in various ways, but 
the two most significant roles are cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in 
new institutions such as Partnership for Peace, and crisis management and peace operations beyond the 
territory of NATO allies.”  
3 NATO, North Atlantic Council, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 
6, 1990, par. 6. 
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Alliance stated that it “will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion” 
by offering more regular diplomatic and military contacts.4  At the November 1990 Paris 
meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the member 
states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact made a joint declaration on the improvement of 
their relations and confirmed that they intended to move beyond the decades of mistrust 
and confrontation in order to “increase stability and to build a united Europe.”5   
From December 1991 to May 1997, the relations of the NATO Allies with former 
members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the former Soviet Union took place in a 
number of venues.  One of the earliest venues for discussion was the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC).  Although dialogue did occur in the NACC between 
NATO and the former adversaries, the NACC never reached its intended objective of 
promoting an “institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and 
security issues.”6  According to David S. Yost, 
NACC activities consisted in fact mainly of meetings – workshops, 
seminars, conferences, colloquiums, and so forth.  For this reason, some 
observers called it “a gigantic talking shop where the formal opening 
speeches usually filled up most of the time available and the conclusions 
of the proceedings merely restated the questions originally posed for 
debate.”7 
Another program designed to promote stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic 
area has been NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP).  According to the NATO Handbook, 
 The aim of the Partnership is to enhance stability and security throughout 
Europe…The PfP programme focuses on defence-related cooperation but 
goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership between 
each   Partner   country   and   NATO.   It  has  become  an  important  and 
                                                 
4 Ibid., par. 7, 8. 
5 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), 1990 Paris Summit, Charter of Paris for 
a New Europe, 19-21 November 1990. http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-
1999/summits/paris90e.htm.  Accessed September 2002. 
6 NATO, North Atlantic Council, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, November 8, 1991, 
par. 11. 
7 Yost, NATO Transformed, 95. 
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permanent feature of the European security architecture and is helping to 
expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout 
Europe.8 
In June 1994, Russia signed the PfP framework document.  The NATO Handbook 
states that the program is based on the “principle of self-differentiation.”9  That is, NATO 
and each partner country tailor the program to meet the objectives determined by both 
parties.10  The relationship between NATO and Russia did not blossom into the maturity 
that some had expected.  According to David Yost, writing in 1998, “Russia has been an 
exceptionally passive participant in PfP, except for the programs dealing with civil-
emergency planning.”11  The accomplishments under PfP auspices have, however, been 
less significant than the successful NATO-Russia cooperation in the Balkan 
peacekeeping missions. 
Prior to the Founding Act in May 1997, the highlight of NATO’s consultations 
and cooperation with Russia was its peacekeeping partnership in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR).  
Since January 1996, a brigade of Russian peacekeepers consisting of approximately 1200 
airborne troops has been working alongside NATO troops in the U.S. sector known as 
Multinational Division North.12  In addition, an unprecedented agreement governing the 
command and control relationship between NATO and Russian troops placed a Russian 
General  as  the Special Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).13  
                                                 
8 NATO, NATO Handbook, Chapter 3: The Opening Up of the Alliance, Partnership for Peace, Aim 
and scope.  Updated 8 October 2002.  http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm.  Accessed 
May 2003. 
9 NATO, NATO Handbook, Chapter 3: The Opening Up of the Alliance, Partnership for Peace, 
Procedures and Structures.  Updated 8 October 2002.  
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030203.htm.  Accessed May 2003. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Yost, NATO Transformed, 136. 
12 NATO, Office of Information and Press, NATO and Russia: Partners in Peacekeeping, Brochure 
(Brussels, Belgium), 19 February 2001.  http://www.nato.int/docu/presskit/010219/brocheng.pdf.  Accessed 
July 2002. 
13 Ibid.   
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The Russian General is responsible for advising SACEUR on all matters concerning 
Russia’s participation in SFOR.14  According to a June 2002 NATO Fact Sheet on 
NATO-Russia relations: 
One of the most successful areas of NATO-Russia cooperation has been 
the joint commitment to promoting peace and stability in the Balkans.  
Russia contributes the largest non-NATO contingent to the UN-mandated, 
NATO-led peacekeeping forces and its soldiers have worked alongside 
NATO counterparts since 1996 in support of the international 
community’s efforts to build lasting security and stability in the region.15 
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson wrote that the cooperation between 
NATO and Russia in SFOR “is living proof of a shared commitment that serves Russian, 
NATO and pan-European security interests.”16   
In addition to the military cooperation through SFOR, the political cooperation in 
the Bosnia Contact Group has led to improved relations between Russia and the West.  
“It is noteworthy that the Bosnia Contact Group, formed in April 1994, initially consisted 
of the Quad [France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States] plus Russia.  
At the outset, the Contact Group was officially composed of U.S. and Russian 
representatives, plus three from the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia 
(ICFY) who would nominally speak for the UN, the European Union, and the ICFY.”17  
Since several other major institutions – the United Nations (UN); the European Union 
(EU); the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), renamed the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) effective 1 January 1995 – 
had been unable to prevent or stop the war in the former Yugoslavia, the emergence of a 
Russian-Western relationship became more important.  Although each of these 
institutions, as well as the Contact Group, contributed in part to peace in the Balkans, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the West needed Russian participation in order to establish 
security and stability in Southeastern Europe. 
 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 NATO, “NATO-Russia Relations,” NATO Fact Sheets, 11 June 2002.  
http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/nato-rus.htm.  Accessed July 2002 
16 Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, “Prospects for NATO-Russia Relations,” Front Line 
17 Yost, NATO Transformed, 184. 
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Throughout this volatile period between 1990 and 1997, it became clear that 
NATO needed to establish a special relationship with the other key player on the 
European continent – Russia.  Initiatives such as the NACC, PfP, IFOR/SFOR, and the 
Contact Group, combined with NATO’s enlargement, led to negotiations on a special 
NATO-Russia relationship.  In May 1997, NATO and Russia formalized their special 
relationship with the endorsement of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation 
and Security.  Although relations between Russia and the Allies were continuing to 
improve, coming to an agreement on the Founding Act involved some challenges. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOUNDING ACT 
The Founding Act was the pinnacle of NATO-Russia relations in the 1990s.  
According to a NATO fact sheet,  
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attributed particular importance 
to developing cooperation with Russia, whose involvement is critical for 
any comprehensive post-Cold War system of European security.  Russia 
was a founding member of the NACC in 1991 and joined the Partnership 
for Peace in 1994.  However, the true basis for the development of a 
strong and durable partnership between NATO and Russia was provided 
by the 1997 Founding Act.18  
Discussions on the terms of the Founding Act were not entirely amicable.  
According to the memoirs of the former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, 
difficulties began when Moscow realized that “The US was not interested in talking 
about enlargement with Russia, but favoured the idea of talking about NATO-Russia 
relations in a broader context (ie enlargement was already decided).”19  High-level 
discussions about NATO-Russian relations started at the beginning of 1996 with one-on-
one talks between Russia and several NATO member states.  According to Primakov, 
“the US was showing signs of irritation at the way Russia was talking in parallel with 
other NATO members.”20  As a result, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and 
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov were prominent figures in the discussions 
                                                 
18 NATO, “NATO-Russia relations,” NATO Fact Sheets, 11 June 2002. 
19 Yevgeny M. Primakov, Years in Big Politics, trans. and abridged J B K Lough, F-70, Camberley 
Surrey, England: Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, The 
Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2000, p. 3.  http://www.cscr.ac.uk/frames/frames_page.htm.  
Accessed August 2002. 
20 Ibid., p. 5. 
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with U.S. Secretaries of State Warren Christopher (January 1993 - January 1997) and 
Madeleine Albright (January 1997 – January 2001).21   
From the onset of the negotiations, each side had different goals for the Founding 
Act.  According to an analysis by Peter Trenin-Straussov, 
The main objective of NATO leaders was to enlarge the alliance without 
at the same time jeopardizing its relations with Russia.  The main 
objective of the Russian leadership, once it realized that it couldn’t stop 
the enlargement process, was to win security assurances from NATO 
which would minimize the material impact of enlargement on Russia’s 
national security.22 
Prime Minister Primakov’s work Years in Big Politics also suggests that Russia 
was concerned about security assurances in the Founding Act.  In Primakov’s words,  
Russia needed a fairly detailed document which defined its relations with 
NATO, and not a declaration along the lines of ‘we will not attack each 
other’.  If we were going to create a NATO-Russia Council [the 
Permanent Joint Council] we had to agree on the basis on which it would 
work, the nature of the problems it would and would not deal with, as well 
as which decisions were binding or not.  I emphasised that the framework 
principles of CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty] 
modernisation should be reflected in the document since we could not 
accept an agreement with NATO without settling the issue of the non-
approach of the NATO military machine towards our territory.23 
In the early months of 1997, several rounds of negotiations had taken place, but 
little was accomplished.  According to Primakov, “We had the impression that our 
NATO partners were not in a hurry and were, perhaps, slowing down movement towards 
concrete agreements” by paying particular attention to the political and organizational 
aspects of the document while avoiding the military issues.24  The Russians concluded 
that they “had reached an impasse” and that NATO was waiting for the results of the 
Russian-American Helsinki Summit, which was to take place in March 1997.25   
                                                 
21 Ibid.,  p. 5. 
22 Peter Trenin-Straussov, The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in 1997-1999: Anatomy of a 
Failure, (Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, BITS Research Note 99.1 ISSN 1434-3258, 
July 1999) http://www.bits.de/public/researchnote/rn99-1.htm.  Accessed August 2002. 
23 Primakov, Years in Big Politics, p. 6.  
24 Ibid., p. 10. 
25 Ibid. 
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According to RFE/RL journalist Sonia Winter, “Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill 
Clinton ended their Helsinki summit…declaring it was a success.”26  Russia and the 
United States made major progress on European security, arms control, the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, and economic issues.27  With regard to NATO enlargement and 
NATO-Russia relations, both sides walked away with acceptable decisions.  Although 
Russia was unable to get a legally binding commitment that NATO enlargement would 
not lead to a threatening buildup of permanently stationed conventional forces and 
nuclear weapons near Russia’s borders, it did leave the summit with the security 
assurances that it needed.28  Tough negotiations on the document continued, and in May 
1997 all of the parties were able to come to an acceptable agreement on the content of the 
Founding Act.   
Most of Russia’s security concerns were addressed in the “Political-Military 
Matters” section of the document, but there was also disagreement over what type of 
document it would be and what to call it.  According to Peter Trenin-Straussov, “Russia 
wanted a legally binding document, preferably a treaty, [or an agreement] with strict 
obligations for both sides.  It wanted not only consultations with NATO, but, more 
importantly, joint decision-making on the major issues of European security, and joint 
action.”29  According to Primakov, “The NATO side favoured [a] ‘Charter’, which would 
offer them more room in [the] future for the interpretation of the binding nature of their 
commitments.”30  Peter Trenin-Straussov states that “In the end, the 
negotiators…reached a formula, which averted a looming crisis in the relations between 
Russia and the West, but produced a compromise which had few enthusiasts on either 
side.”31  The Founding Act, like the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, is a political 
declaration, not a legally binding treaty.  Despite the shaky ground on which the 
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Founding Act was established, it was still a step in the right direction for the 
enhancement of NATO-Russia relations. 
C. PROVISIONS FOR THE PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL 
At the heart of the Founding Act was the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent 
Joint Council. The Founding Act states that “The central objective of the Permanent Joint 
Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of 
consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each 
other’s security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security 
of none.”32  The Founding indicates that the PJC “will provide a mechanism for 
consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for 
joint decisions and joint action” by NATO and Russia.33   
The Founding Act directs that the PJC “will be the principal venue of 
consultations between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation 
affecting peace and stability.”34  Moreover, it directs that the PJC will meet at different 
levels over regular timetables: Foreign and Defense Ministers will meet with their 
respective counterparts twice a year while ambassadors or permanent representatives on 
the North Atlantic Council will meet each month.35  The Founding Act states that the PJC 
may also meet at the level of Heads of State and Government and that it may establish 
working groups or committees for specific areas of cooperation.36 
The Founding Act states that the “Permanent Joint Council will engage in three 
distinct activities: [1] consulting on topics in Section III of this Act and on any other 
political or security issue determined by mutual consent; [2] on the basis of these 
consultations, developing joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to 
speak or act in parallel; [3] once consensus has been reached in the course of 
                                                 
32 NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the 
Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997, Section II. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm.  
Accessed July 2002. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
12 
consultation, making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis.”37  
Section III of the Founding Act lists nineteen broad areas for consultation and 
cooperation and states that “[o]ther areas can be added by mutual agreement.”38  The 
Founding Act and the PJC provided a strong foundation for the establishment of a 
NATO-Russian partnership.  According to Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General at the 
time of the establishment of the Founding Act, “The real depth of the partnership will 
emerge once Russia and NATO staffs start to work closely, even daily, together.”39   
D. KEY EVENTS IN THE PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL’S HISTORY 
This section of the chapter examines the key events in the PJC’s proceedings.  
The PJC’s activities fall into four distinct periods: from its inception in May 1997 to 
March 1999; the suspension of Russian participation from March to June 1999; the 
period of an agenda limited to SFOR and KFOR matters, from July 1999 to February 
2000; and the period from February 2000 until its replacement in May 2002.  
1. The PJC from May 1997 to March 1999 
The first noteworthy meeting of the PJC took place on 11 September 1997 at the 
NATO Headquarters in Brussels.  Prior to this the only other meeting was devoted to 
organizational issues and planning for the content of future meetings.40  According to the 
NATO press release after the 11 September 1997 meeting at the ambassadorial level, the 
two sides agreed to exchange “views on peacekeeping operations, the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and a work programme of the PJC until the end of the year.”41  In addition, 
“All participants welcomed the outcome of the meeting and expressed their determination 
to continue the work in a positive spirit.”42  On the surface, the first meeting was a typical 
media performance with lots of smiles and shaking of hands.  Political analysts, however, 
viewed this meeting with more skepticism. 
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According to RFE/RL’s Paul Goble, the 11 September 1997 meeting of the PJC 
“provided support for those who argue that this body will help to overcome Russian 
suspicions about the Western alliance.  But the session also provided evidence that this 
body may give Moscow a much larger voice over NATO policy than many in the alliance 
appear to want.”43  After giving three arguments for each interpretation, Goble concluded 
that “the debate on whether the new NATO-Russia council gives Moscow only a voice or 
almost a veto will continue, with each meeting providing the occasion for measuring just 
how much it is of each.”44 
The first several meetings all dealt with generally the same topics, namely 
peacekeeping, SFOR, and the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However, as the 
participants grew more accustomed to this forum, the list of topics began to expand.  The 
PJC began to exchange views on diverse issues, including the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and workshops to train retired Russian military officers.  At the 
beginning of the PJC’s second year it began discussions on tough issues in disarmament 
and arms control, including the CFE and Open Skies Treaties.  However, the topics that 
remained foremost on the agenda at each of the monthly meetings were SFOR and the 
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
NATO Secretary General Robertson, in a February 2001 speech at the Moscow 
State Institute of Foreign Relations (MGIMO), provided an impression of the PJC’s 
achievements from its inception in 1997 until Moscow suspended Russian participation 
in March 1999. 
The NATO-Russia PJC met for the first time in July 1997 and it had only 
until March 1999 to show its potential.  The record shows, however, that 
substantial progress was achieved even in this short period.  Not only did 
the PJC establish itself as the venue for NATO-Russia consultations, but a 
whole network of experts’ contacts, Working Groups, and ad-hoc 
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meetings developed under its umbrella, addressing the areas of 
consultation and cooperation foreseen in the Founding Act.45 
Willem Matser, an expert in NATO’s Office of the Special Adviser for Central 
and Eastern Europe, presented a different view: “Despite early optimism, however, it 
rapidly became clear that the PJC was not functioning as intended.  Some of the PJC’s 
shortcomings could be attributed to cultural differences.”46  One such cultural difference 
was NATO’s bottom-up decision-making, in contrast with Russia’s top-down approach 
to negotiations.47   
Matser states that because “NATO functions on the basis of consensus …[it relies 
on] an ongoing process of informal consultations among the Allies’ Permanent 
Representations at NATO headquarters in order to smooth the way towards 
agreement.”48  Russia, however, did not deal individually with each of the member states 
of the Alliance, and Moscow did not maintain a permanent presence at NATO 
headquarters.49  Therefore, when Moscow attended the meetings of the PJC, it was not 
prepared to effectively participate in the “consensus-building process” that was taking 
place.50  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Jeffrey Donovan reports that, 
according to “Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russia program at Washington’s Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace,…the PJC foundered because Russian officials never 
really made an effort to make it work.”51  Ira Straus notes that “there was a persistent fear 
that Moscow might disrupt the existing NATO consensus and divide the allies if it was 
allowed to talk freely with them.  Based on this fear, it was decided that NATO must not 
talk to Russia in the Permanent Joint Council until NATO had first reached its own 
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common position separately, thus ensuring the council’s ineffectiveness.”52  The pre-
coordinated positions of the Allies, combined with a fear of Russian attempts to erode 
Alliance solidarity, evidently contributed to a confrontational “19 versus 1” format 
instead of the “19 plus 1” format that was envisioned in the Founding Act.   
The PJC functioned, in other words, as a forum in which each side presented its 
views.  Russia and NATO were committed, however, to improving bilateral relations.  In 
February 1998 the inauguration of the NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow took 
place.  On 18 March 1998 a Russian Mission to NATO was established.  Two months 
later, Russia and NATO welcomed the beginning of negotiations to establish reciprocal 
Military Liaison Missions.  All of these events were envisaged in the Founding Act and 
were designed to improve NATO-Russia relations and to help facilitate cooperation.  
According to a NATO press release, “The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 
had an extraordinary meeting on Thursday 18 June [1998] at NATO Headquarters.  
Ambassadors exchanged views on the situation in Kosovo and on the international 
community’s response to the crisis in the light of the meeting held by the President of the 
Russian Federation [Boris Yeltsin] and the President of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia [Slobodan Milosevic] in Moscow on 16 June 1998.”53  From this point on, 
Kosovo became the central topic in NATO-Russia discussions. 
2. The PJC and the Kosovo Crisis 
Initially both Russia and NATO called for diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful 
solution to the crisis in Kosovo.  In addition, both NATO and Russia expressed a deep 
concern about the serious humanitarian crisis that was taking place in Kosovo.  In the fall 
of 1998 NATO and Russia called for Belgrade’s immediate and full compliance with the 
United Nations Security Council resolutions on the Kosovo crisis. At the 13 October 
1998 PJC meeting it was clear that NATO and Russian views on Kosovo had begun to go 
in different directions.  NATO informed Russia about its “decision to issue an Activation 
Order (ACTORD) for the limited air response and the phased air operation, underlying its 
determination to help put an end to the intolerable humanitarian situation in Kosovo and 
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to support ongoing efforts aimed at a political solution.”54  Russia reiterated its firm 
commitment to pursue a political settlement and expressed opposition to any military 
action.55   
NATO and Russia pledged their full support for the international verification 
missions for Kosovo and the ongoing peace talks in Rambouillet.  They “urged the 
parties to work responsibly and intensively in order to achieve an interim political 
agreement.”56  According to the 17 March 1999 PJC press statement, “NATO and Russia 
continued their regular consultations on the crisis in Kosovo…[and] will continue their 
efforts aimed at peace and stability in the region.”57  On 24 March 1999 NATO began a 
78-day bombing campaign against targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in order to stop the “ethnic cleansing” in the Serbian province of Kosovo. 
In protest over NATO’s actions, Russia suspended its participation in the PJC.  
According to Lord Robertson, “Our relationship was plunged into its most serious 
crisis.”58  Dimitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, has described 
the impact of Kosovo. 
NATO strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia…came as a 
shock to many in Russia.  The use of force without the express sanction of 
a United Nations Security Council resolution dramatically devalued not 
only the Russian veto right but also the former superpower’s actual 
international weight.  Moscow was shown to be impotent to prevent a 
major international military operation in an area, which it traditionally 
regards as crucial to its entire position in Europe.59 
It is worth noting that Trenin seems more concerned about Russia’s status and 
influence than about the UN Charter.  The Kosovo crisis significantly affected NATO-
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Russia relations.  Whatever progress the PJC had made during the nearly three years of 
its existence appeared to have vanished. 
Oksana Antonenko, a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, presented a Russian perspective on one of the lessons of the Kosovo crisis.  
According to Antonenko:  
[T]he much-touted institutions for confidence-building and cooperation 
between Russia and NATO – including the Permanent Joint Council – 
failed when tested by their first real crisis.  Facing a stark conflict of 
interests – interests that are important but not vital to each side’s security – 
the former adversaries sacrificed the years of hard work spent establishing 
good relations, and now chose to ignore each other’s opinions.  The 1997 
Russia-NATO Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security failed not only to ensure joint decision-making, but even a 
working mechanism for crisis management.  All of the forms of Russia-
NATO cooperation supposedly institutionalized by the Founding Act were 
terminated [by Russia] immediately following the start of NATO 
bombing.60 
Immediately after the strikes, Russia took steps to express its opposition to 
NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo crisis.  Leonid Ivashov, head of the main directorate 
for international military cooperation of the Defense Ministry, declared, “We have 
already told you that we have recalled our military representatives from NATO.  We also 
have recalled the servicemen who were being educated in military educational 
establishments in the countries taking part in the aggression against Yugoslavia.  We 
have recalled all our delegations from these states.”61  Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov stated that “The NATO information service representative in Moscow has been 
told to leave Russia…We no longer have and will have no more contacts with the NATO 
leadership, including its secretary-general, until the aggression against Yugoslavia 
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stops.”62  Moreover, the ITAR-TASS news agency reported, “the opening of a NATO 
communication mission in Moscow has been postponed ‘until the better times’.”63   
Russia’s suspension of dialogue and cooperation with NATO spread to the PfP program, 
the Permanent Joint Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.  Despite these 
seemingly harsh actions, Russia maintained diplomatic links and relationships that served 
its own interests.  According to Pavel Felgengauer, 
Gen. Thomas Kuenning, the Pentagon’s man in charge of the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) program, had been scheduled to visit Moscow in 
late March [1999].  The visit was then cancelled, but the Russian 
authorities later decided that the CTR program meant too much to Russia 
to be sacrificed out of solidarity with the Serbs.  As a result, Kuenning was 
received in Moscow this week…This week Gen. Kuenning visited a 
training center at Sergiyev Posad where officers of the Defense Ministry’s 
12th Chief Administration will be testing security systems for nuclear 
munitions in conjunction with American experts.  The systems judged to 
be the most suitable will be purchased with funds from the U.S. 
government and installed at Russia’s nuclear weapons facilities…[T]he 
obvious benefits deriving from the Nunn-Lugar program are a good 
guarantee that it will be the last program to be shut down if relations 
continue to deteriorate, and the first to be revived as soon as another 
warming trend arrives in relations between Moscow and Washington.64 
Owing in part to pressure from Moscow, it appears, Milosevic accepted a peace 
proposal.  On 10 June 1999, NATO forces ended their bombing campaign.  The next day, 
approximately 200 Russian troops made an unexpected dash to the Pristina airport.  Their 
mission was apparently to seize the airport as a point of insertion for troops to be airlifted 
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from Russia to enable Moscow to control a large part of Kosovo; this might have given 
Moscow a strong bargaining position regarding Kosovo’s fate and the terms of Russian 
participation in a Kosovo peacekeeping operation.65  According to Oksana Antonenko, 
“The race to Pristina undoubtedly speeded up negotiations between Moscow and NATO 
commanders on Russia’s role in KFOR.  However, the Russian military was not pleased 
with the results of those negotiations.  Russia had to give up its demands for a special 
sector of Kosovo, independent of NATO’s chain of command.  Nor could Russian troops 
take control over heavily Serb-populated areas.  Negotiations over the exact deployment 
of Russia’s troops in the British, US, French and German sectors dragged on until August 
[1999].”66   
3. The PJC from July 1999 to February 2000 
Although the Kosovo crisis led to some antagonism between Russia and the West, 
both sides believed that relations would return to normal.  According to Irina Lagunina, 
“The two [unidentified NATO] experts said that despite Russia’s decision to formally 
withdraw cooperation with NATO, they believed that future cooperation was 
inevitable.”67  According to Antonenko, “By August 1999, at least one opinion poll 
showed some improvement in mood.  Asking ‘How do you think relations between 
Russia and NATO will develop after the Kosovo conflict?’, the poll results showed that 
only 17% expected relations to undergo Cold War tensions, while 52% supported gradual 
normalisation.  Prime Minister Vladimir Putin gave the justification for such 
normalisation when he said that ‘Russia should be and will be an integral part of the 
civilised world and in this context we will cooperate with NATO’.”68  Russia’s 
suspension of activities in the PJC lasted for nearly four months.      
On 23 July 1999, after nearly a four-month absence, Russia resumed its dialogue 
with NATO and returned to the Permanent Joint Council.  Under the auspices of the 
Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia issued a Statement on the Security Situation 
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in Kosovo.  According to the statement, “NATO and Russia will continue to consider in 
the PJC ways of further improving security in Kosovo.”69  As Dmitri Trenin points out, 
however, “By the end of 1999, Russia-NATO relations had not fully recovered from the 
blow dealt by Kosovo.  The word partnership was no longer mentioned.  Cooperation and 
dialogue were still limited to the two ongoing peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, 
SFOR and KFOR.”70  Moreover, Trenin adds,  
Towards the end of 1999, Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West 
were further aggravated, first by the corruption scandal and soon thereafter 
by the second war in Chechnya.  From the Russian point of view, these 
developments overshadowed problems with NATO…[M]ounting Western 
criticism over Russia’s human rights record in the northern Caucasus has 
raised the spectre of Moscow’s international isolation for the first time 
since the end of the Cold War…[However, Russia] now urgently needs to 
mend its fences with the West for a host of financial, economic and 
political reasons.71 
In light of these events and the changing international political climate with the 
arrival of new leadership in both Moscow and NATO, the prospect for improved relations 
looked promising.   
4. The PJC from February 2000 to May 2002 
According to A.V. Grushko, Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry 
All-European Cooperation Department, “After the Yugoslav situation was brought back 
into the international legal field political contacts with NATO began to be restored.  In 
February 2000 NATO Secretary General George Robertson visited Moscow.  During the 
course of the visit, in addition to a thorough review of current relations between Russia 
and NATO, the first conceptual conversation about prospects for the future took place.”72 
During the February 2000 meeting, Lord Robertson, who had then been NATO’s 
Secretary General for four months, and Russia’s new acting president Vladimir Putin 
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“negotiated a joint statement on the restoration of full relations between the alliance and 
Russia.”73  The joint statement said that  
NATO and Russia are fully determined to contribute to building a stable 
and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all of its 
peoples…They will promote the strengthening of security in the Euro-
Atlantic area on the basis of the Founding Act and through cooperation 
within the Permanent Joint Council…NATO and Russia will work to 
intensify their dialogue in the Permanent Joint Council.  They agree that 
Russia and NATO would pursue a vigorous dialogue on a wide range of 
security issues that will enable NATO and Russia to address the 
challenges that lie ahead and to make their mutual cooperation a 
cornerstone of European security.74 
Both parties applauded the decision to improve relations.  According to Lord 
Robertson, “After my visit to Moscow this February, I feel that we are at a new juncture 
in NATO-Russia relations…I am also very much encouraged by Acting President Putin’s 
remarks made following my visit.  They reflect a willingness to engage Europe, including 
the Alliance, to cooperate and to move the NATO-Russia relationship forward.”75  
Furthermore, in June 2000, “Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, speaking at a joint 
press conference with Lord Robertson after the session of the Permanent Joint Council, 
said the Russian leadership attached importance to a renewal of the dialogue with NATO 
which served to strengthen European stability and security.  ‘We have a mutual interest in 
fully taking account of the interests and concerns of each other,’ Ivanov said, declaring 
his satisfaction that the talks had been frank and substantial.”76 
Willem Matser has reported that NATO-Russia relations continued to improve 
and “[b]y spring 2001, the PJC’s work agenda had expanded to cover a wide range of 
issues of mutual interest…Indeed,  the  programme  was  almost  as  broad as the one that 
existed at the end of 1998.  In February 2001, after a year of negotiations, NATO 
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Secretary General Lord Robertson was able to inaugurate a NATO Information Office in 
Moscow.”77 
The ongoing involvement of Russia and NATO in SFOR and KFOR reinforced 
the need for improved relations.  In subsequent meetings, the dialogue began to extend to 
topics that had been discussed prior to NATO’s Kosovo campaign.   
Major developments in NATO-Russia relations took place after the terrorist 
attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001.  On 13 September 2001, the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council convened an extraordinary meeting at the 
Ambassadorial level at which Russia and the Allies pledged to work together in the 
struggle against international terrorism.  According to the NATO press statement:  
The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council…expressed its anger and 
indignation at the barbaric acts committed against the people of the United 
States of America. The deepest sympathies of Allies and Russia lie with 
the victims and their families. While Allies and Russia have suffered from 
terrorist attacks against civilians, the horrific scale of the attacks of 11 
September is without precedent in modern history. NATO and Russia are 
united in their resolve not to let those responsible for such an inhuman act 
to go unpunished. NATO and Russia call on the entire international 
community to unite in the struggle against terrorism.78   
Over the next several months, high-level discussions took place in which Russia 
and NATO exchanged information and views on how to combat terrorism.79  At the 7 
December 2001 meeting of the PJC at the Foreign Minister level, NATO and Russia 
agreed to begin discussions on the development of a new council that would bring the 
Alliance’s member states and Russia together “to identify and pursue opportunities for 
joint action at 20.”80 
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Cooperation in the struggle against terrorism continued to be the foundation of the 
new relationship.  On 4 February 2002, NATO and Russia held a joint conference on the 
role of the military in combating terrorism.  According to a keynote address by Secretary 
General Robertson, “This conference is another step towards turning a tragedy into an 
opportunity: a strong relationship befitting NATO and Russia, and benefiting the entire 
Euro-Atlantic community.”81  Cooperation between NATO and Russia continued.  On 27 
May 2002, on the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Founding Act and on the 
eve of the Rome Summit, NATO opened its Military Liaison Mission in Moscow in order 
to “support the implementation of the military cooperation and serve as the principal 
liaison between NATO HQ and the Russian Ministry of Defence.”82   
On 28 May 2002, NATO and Russia declared that they were determined to 
achieve “A New Quality” in their bilateral relations.  The signing of this declaration 
created the new NATO-Russia Council.  According to the Rome Declaration, “In the 
framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as 
equal partners in areas of common interest.  The NATO-Russia Council will provide a 
mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint 
action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues 
in the Euro-Atlantic region.”83 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY   
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze one of the most significant new 
roles of the Alliance, namely the pursuit of dialogue and cooperation with Russia, the 
largest successor state to the former Soviet adversary.  The chapter has examined the 
development of the NATO-Russia relationship within the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 
and has considered explanations of why the PJC did not achieve its desired outcome – 
e.g., the Alliance’s reliance on pre-coordinated positions.  The chapter has reviewed how 
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NATO-Russia relations in the immediate post-Cold War period led to the 1997 Founding 
Act.  It has examined the issues that influenced the contents of the Founding Act and 
Russia’s view of the completed document.  The chapter has also analyzed some of the 
key events of the PJC’s history and has examined the events that contributed to the 
replacement of the PJC by the NATO-Russia Council.  However, a more detailed 
analysis of the origins of the NATO-Russia Council is offered in Chapter III. 
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III. ORIGINS OF THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL 
This chapter discusses the origins of the NATO-Russia Council.  It begins with an 
overview of Russia’s relations with the West when Vladimir Putin became the acting 
President of Russia.  It then describes how the terrorist attacks against the United States 
on 11 September 2001 led to a new period of cooperation between Russia and the West.  
Although the events of 11 September marked the turning point in better cooperation 
between the Allies and Russia, each side has pursued this new relationship because of its 
own motives.  The chapter analyzes the apparent motives of British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, of the NATO nations collectively, and of President Vladimir Putin and the Russian 
Federation.   
A. RUSSIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST IN DECEMBER 1999 
The NATO-Russia Council formally began with the 28 May 2002 signing of the 
document “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality.”  However, it can be argued that a 
new quality in NATO-Russia relations began on 31 December 1999 when Vladimir Putin 
became Russia’s acting president.  When Putin took over the presidency from Boris 
Yeltsin, “one of his first foreign policy decisions was to end the year-long ‘freeze’ in 
NATO-Russia relations.”84  The Russian decision to put on ice normal relations with 
NATO can be directly attributed to two key events during the spring of 1999.  According 
to Mark A. Smith, “Russian perceptions of the 1999 NATO strategic concept, which 
arguably justified the use of military force without necessarily gaining the consent of the 
UN Security Council…[and] NATO’s failure to consult adequately with Russia over its 
decision to take military action against Yugoslavia” led to a division between Russia and 
NATO.85  Despite the frigid relationship at the onset of his presidency, Putin had a 
foreign and domestic policy agenda that envisioned Russia closely tied to the West.  This 
is consistent with the fact that Putin, like many Russians, identifies Russia “as belonging 
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more to Western than Eastern civilization.”86  According to Vladimir Baranovsky of the 
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Europe is Russia’s “most 
important region” in terms of “fundamental interests in the international arena” and “the 
major would-be focus of its long-term international strategy.”87  Alexander Vershbow, 
the current U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, has stated, “Even before the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, President Putin had made a strategic choice for closer 
relations with Europe and the United States, setting aside the competitive, confrontational 
approach of the Soviet past.”88  A September 2002 article in The Economist offered the 
following assessment of Putin: “A pragmatist in foreign policy as in everything else, he 
had started looking for closer ties with America and Europe, and a bigger role for Russia 
in international bodies, well before September 11th last year.”89    Despite Putin’s 
Western orientation and his foreign policy initiatives, relations with NATO were strained 
prior to 11 September 2001.  According to an article in China’s Xinhua Roundup, “With 
Putin elected president, Russia tried to mend fences with NATO, but with little 
success.”90  However, the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 
2001 provided a “powerful boost” to NATO-Russia relations, “suddenly thrusting the 
window of opportunity wide open.”91 
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B. 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: A NEW PERIOD OF COOPERATION BETWEEN 
NATO AND RUSSIA 
Willem Matser, a Dutch expert regarding NATO-Russia relations on the NATO 
International Staff, has highlighted the significance of the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks for NATO-Russia relations.  According to Matser, “Few events bring people 
together more effectively than a tragedy and few tragedies have been greater or their 
consequences more wide-reaching than that of 11 September…In the wake of this shared 
disaster, the unity of purpose of Allies and Russia in the face of a common threat has 
been a key feature of the international coalition’s war on terrorism. Moreover, the shuttle 
diplomacy, summits and flurry of new proposals of recent months have clearly opened up 
great opportunities for closer cooperation and a deeper relationship between NATO and 
Russia.”92   
According to Mitchell A. Orenstein, the Special Editor for the April 2002 Issue of 
Russia Watch, “Following the events of September 11…a chorus of world leaders have 
proposed bold new ideas for the future of global security.  None have been more 
influential than those of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who, in the immediate wake 
of September 11, proposed a new collaboration between Russia and the West.  This 
initiative was seized upon by Western leaders.”93  Although both sides were instrumental 
in developing a closer relationship, in conjunction with the international coalition’s war 
on terrorism, President Putin initiated the rapprochement.  Leon Aron, a resident scholar 
and Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, has noted that soon 
after the terrorists flew the high-jacked airliners into the World Trade Center towers and 
the Pentagon, President Putin was the first foreign leader to contact President Bush.94  In 
addition to publicly denouncing the attacks and pledging his support to the American 
people, Putin responded to the United States military’s heightened state of alert by 
“standing down its [Russia’s] troops and canceling scheduled strategic bomber and 
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missile exercises.”95  During the next two days, Putin again phoned Bush to discuss 
Russian cooperation against terrorism.96  Moreover, “[a]t Russia’s instigation, the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council condemned the attacks in the strongest terms and 
pledged an ‘intensification’ of cooperation ‘to fight the scourge of terrorism’.”97   
Since the 11 September attacks Putin has taken numerous actions to support the 
war on terrorism and has made key decisions to enhance Russia’s relations with the 
United States, NATO and the West.  According to Sergei Blagov, “Russia has undertaken 
a series of friendly gestures towards the US.  Last October [2001], the Kremlin 
announced a shutdown of its Cold War era military facilities, a spy station in Lourdes, 
Cuba, and a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.”98  Mark Smith reported that 
“Moscow has become part of this anti-terrorist coalition, and will cooperate in the 
exchange of intelligence, in cutting off the sources of financial support for terrorist 
groups and allowing its airspace to be used by the USA for humanitarian missions.”99  
Putin has made these bold moves despite opposition from some high-level Russian 
political and military officials   
According to Sarah E. Mendelson, a Russia and Eurasia expert at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies:   
As the political leadership in Russia expressed – at first cautiously, then 
more enthusiastically – its willingness to cooperate on fighting terrorism, 
the military leadership lagged behind noticeably.  Chief of the General 
Staff Anatoly Kvashnin busily argued that Russia would not participate in 
U.S. retaliatory actions.  Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov refused to 
consider the possibility that troops from NATO members would be 
deployed in any state of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
declaring that there were “absolutely no grounds, not even for hypothetical 
suggestions.”100   
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Sergei Blagov reported that “Russia’s initial opposition to the stationing of 
American military forces close to its borders in Central Asia made its neighboring 
Central Asian states reject the idea of letting American forces use their territories for the 
operation in Afghanistan.  However, Russia eventually changed its position due to its 
interest in seeing the Taliban regime fall, as well as in expanding its ties with the US.”101  
Leon Aron noted that “With Russia’s blessing, two C-130 U.S. military cargo planes and 
100 U.S. military personnel arrived at an airbase near Tashkent, capital of 
Uzbekistan…[Three days later on 25 September 2001] Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 
announced that U.S. troops could use military facilities in Tajikistan to launch strikes into 
Afghanistan.”102  According to The Economist, “Hardline Russians still complain that 
Mr. Putin has let their country’s world position slip – for instance, by allowing American 
troops into former Soviet Central Asia and by raising too few objections to NATO 
membership for the three Baltic republics.”103   
Putin ignored the opposition and continued to court the West.  Leon Aron 
reported that on 3 October 2001, “Putin made the first visit to NATO headquarters in 
Brussels by any Russian or Soviet leader.  After meetings with the secretary general, 
Putin announced Russia’s ‘great readiness to cooperate and interact’ with NATO.  He 
also signaled a softening in Russia’s opposition to further NATO enlargement, even 
including the three former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.”104  The 
West gladly welcomed Putin’s willingness to cooperate and interact.  
The diplomatic responses by both parties in the wake of 11 September “helped to 
transform the nature of the US-Russian relationship from partnership to quasi-
alliance.”105  This new relationship was outlined in the 13 November 2001 Joint 
Statement by President Bush and President Putin on a new Relationship between the 
United States and Russia:  
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Aware of our responsibility to contribute to international security, we are 
determined to work together, and with other nations and international 
organizations, including the United Nations, to promote security, 
economic well-being, and a peaceful, prosperous, free world.  We affirm 
our determination to meet the threats to peace in the 21st century.  Among 
these threats are terrorism,…proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
militant nationalism, ethnic and religious intolerance, and regional 
instability.106 
The events of 11 September, and the joint statement by Presidents Bush and Putin 
two months later, helped to transform the nature of the NATO-Russia relationship as 
well.  According to the joint statement by President Bush and President Putin, “We 
support the building of a Euro-Atlantic community whole, free, and at peace, excluding 
no one, and respecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
nations.  To this end, the United States and Russia will work, together with NATO and 
other NATO members, to improve, strengthen, and enhance the relationship between 
NATO and Russia, with a view to developing new, effective mechanisms for 
consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action.”107  This joint 
statement established the framework for the NATO-Russia Council that was founded six 
months later, and the founding declaration included almost exactly the same words.108  
Although 11 September came to be recognized as “a turning point in relations between 
the West and Russia” and “a decisive catalyst for the new spirit of cooperation between 
the Allies and Russia,” each side pursued this new relationship because of its own 
motives.109  Sergei Rogov, Paul Fritch, and many other analysts agree that the terrorist 
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attacks on 11 September were probably the impetus for the new relationship.  However, 
more important than this key event were the motives and intentions of each side. 
C. BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR’S INITIATIVE  
One key figure behind the establishment of better Russian-NATO relations, post-
11 September, was Prime Minister Tony Blair.  In a letter to NATO’s Secretary General 
Robertson, Blair wrote, “The contacts which you, I and other NATO leaders have had 
with President Putin since 11 September suggest that we now have an opportunity to 
achieve a transformation in Euro-Atlantic security.”110 In a separate letter to President 
Putin, Blair wrote, “I believe we now have an opportunity to achieve a lasting 
transformation in Euro-Atlantic security based upon a new partnership between Russia 
and NATO.”111  These documents suggest that Blair was motivated by the opportunity to 
replace the failed PJC.  In his letter to the NATO Secretary General, Blair wrote, “I 
believe that we must seize the opportunity presented by the current crisis and build upon 
this willingness to find new ways in which to work together…I strongly believe that we 
need to launch this new beginning in a way which changes mind sets…[W]e need to re-
launch co-operation by replacing the PJC with a new body which would be tasked with 
finding new ways and areas in which NATO and Russia can work together at 20 rather 
than 19 + 1.”112   
  In light of the sentiments expressed in the joint statement by Presidents Bush and 
Putin two days before, it can be argued that Prime Minister Blair decided that a European 
could most effectively sell the concept of a new NATO-Russia relationship to the other 
European members of the Alliance.  In his letter to Lord Robertson¸ Blair wrote, “I fully 
support the sentiments expressed in the joint statement agreed by President Bush and 
President Putin on 13 November…I hope that it will be possible to take this discussion 
forward rapidly within NATO with a view to launching a process at the December [2001] 
NATO Ministerial meetings, which would lead to agreement at the May Ministerial 
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meetings.”113  In his letter to President Putin Blair wrote, “I have now written to Lord 
Robertson and other NATO leaders to launch formally the ideas which we have 
discussed.”114  Given the U.S.-Russian Joint Statement and the subsequent diplomatic 
activity by British Prime Minister Blair, it is reasonable to conclude that Blair was 
promoting the Russo-American proposition within NATO channels. 
D. MOTIVES OF NATO NATIONS 
Various analysts have speculated on the motives of NATO nations in seeking 
better relations with Russia.  For example, some observers have suggested that a motive 
may be removing any Russian obstacles to NATO’s next round of enlargement.  
According to Mark Galeotti, the new NATO-Russia relationship “represents both a 
triumph and a defeat…It is a defeat in that the Kremlin has been forced to acquiesce to 
further NATO enlargement.”115  Keith Richburg reported in the Washington Post that 
“by creating the council and enshrining it in the ‘Rome Declaration’ signed here today by 
all 20 heads of government, NATO is making the alliance’s planned expansion more 
palatable to Moscow.”116  Secretary of State Powell said: “That [knowing Russia still 
opposes NATO’s enlargement] does not surprise or shock me - - it’s been the Russian 
position for some time…[However,] I think we have succeeded in making the 
enlargement of NATO once again less of a problem for the Russians and less of an 
irritant in our relations.”117  Prime Minister Blair also acknowledged that establishing a 
new NATO-Russian relationship before the Prague Summit would “greatly help the 
handling of the NATO enlargement debate.”118  According to Susan Glasser of the 
Washington Post, some Russians also see the new NATO-Russia Council as a way to 
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“mute Russian opposition to NATO’s expansion.”119   Although officials have 
“categorically denied any links between NATO-Russia cooperation and enlargement of 
the alliance,” many observers see it as a repetition of the events that preceded the 
enlargement in 1997-1999.120   
Another motive for NATO nations in seeking better relations with Russia is that 
Moscow’s cooperation is vital in combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).  According to Sergei Rogov, the Director of the Institute for 
U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, “The West must 
recognize that NATO’s efforts to deal effectively with twenty-first century threats will be 
far more successful if they are accompanied by closer cooperation with Russia.”121  As 
previously discussed, the Russian Federation has been an extremely valuable member of 
America’s anti-terrorism coalition and will (it is hoped) continue to be so in the future.  
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson also understands the need for Russian 
cooperation against terrorism.  In a speech given at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow 
on 22 November 2001, he said, “if we want to come up with any meaningful response to 
the terrorist menace, to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other new 
and emerging threats, we need a solid NATO-Russia relationship…[T]he current state of 
NATO-Russia relations is not sufficient to deal seriously with the new security 
challenges that confront us today and tomorrow.”122   
Another argument regarding the West’s motives in seeking a new relationship 
with Russia is that it encourages transparency and prevents suspicions between NATO 
and the Russian Federation.  According to Celeste A. Wallander, the Director and Senior 
Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, “The [NATO-Russia] council could, if properly utilized, create transparency 
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about Western intentions and plans to allay suspicions that they are pretexts to encircle 
Russia throughout Europe and Eurasia.”123  The following analysis by Paul Fritch is an 
excellent illustration of how the Allies could refer to the 11 September terrorist attacks to 
reinforce their argument that NATO is not directed against Russia: 
For years, we had maintained that: “NATO and Russia share common 
interests,” and “NATO is not directed against Russia.”  For years, 
Russia’s political leaders had joined us in these statements, but then 
returned home to perpetuate the stereotype of a hostile, aggressive 
Alliance, bent on “encircling” and marginalizing Russia…Yet on 12 
September 2001, when NATO – for the first time in its 53-year history – 
declared itself to be under attack, the enemy was not the “red menace” to 
the east, but terrorism.124 
The West saw the new international situation as an opportunity to do away with 
any remaining Cold War animosity. 
The Allies may have also embraced better relations with Moscow because they 
want to capitalize on Russia’s diplomatic ties with nations that do not have strong ties 
with the West.  According to The Economist, “staying friendly with such traditional allies 
[as Iraq and North Korea] is pragmatic and sensible, not just for [economic] investment, 
which would be small, but because Russia could be a mediator that one day helps even 
such renegades as North Korea to open up.”125  Western nations have drawn upon 
Russia’s diplomatic status with respect to certain world crises.  According to Ian 
Bremmer, “President George W. Bush asked President Vladimir Putin to help initiate 
mediation between India and Pakistan.  At the recent Asian Summit in Almaty, Putin 
worked hard to bring [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee to the negotiating table,” to try to settle their conflict over the 
highly disputed Kashmir region.126   
E. MOTIVES OF PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN AND RUSSIA 
The motives of President Putin and Russia also deserve analysis.  The thesis has 
already suggested that prior to the 11 September terrorist attacks against the United 
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States, President Putin had a foreign and domestic policy agenda that envisioned Russia 
closely tied to the West.  President Putin’s post-11 September actions were consistent 
with this agenda.  According to Leon Aron, an expert on Russia at the American 
Enterprise Institute, “Putin’s response to the war on terrorism was, in fact, fundamentally 
consistent with the 1990’s foreign policy of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin…This course 
in foreign policy, moreover, was itself a product of the Russian nation’s new domestic 
direction—the new course charted by the anti-Communist revolution.”127   
Many other arguments have been advanced to explain Russia’s motivation for its 
support for the war on terrorism and its desire for improved relations with the West. For 
example, one of the main arguments is that Russia wishes to gain support from NATO 
nations for its war in Chechnya.  According to Stephen Blank, a Professor of National 
Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, “It is 
strange that a regime so adamantly opposed to international terrorism wavered about 
entering into powerful alliances against this scourge.  Beyond providing intelligence 
support and possibly ceasing its proliferation of arms to rogue states, Russia wants 
considerable compensation for its new approach, specifically, U.S. and Western 
endorsement of its war in Chechnya.”128  Vladimir Shlapentokh, a Professor of Sociology 
at Michigan State University, states that Putin “recognizes the importance of gaining the 
support of the international community in his war against Chechnya.”129  Gail W. 
Lapidus, a senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies and Professor of Political 
Science at Stanford University, also supports this argument.  In her view, Putin “has 
attempted to reframe the [Chechnya] conflict as a war on terrorism and to win American 
and Western acquiescence in, if not support for, Russia’s military campaign by arguing 
that the threat posed by international terrorism in Chechnya was not limited to Russia but 
was a threat to the West as a whole.”130   
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As Mark Galeotti has pointed out, “Since his [Putin’s] prompt offers of sympathy 
and support after 11 September, the West has been much less critical of operations in 
Chechnya.”131  In a speech at the NATO-Russia Conference on the Military Role in 
Combating Terrorism on 4 February 2002, Lord Robertson said, “The terrorist threat is 
not new.  Our Russian colleagues, who have seen the tragic loss of countless military and 
civilian lives at the hands of terrorists over the past decade, can bear witness to that.”132  
Although not specifically stated, Lord Robertson was probably referring to events in 
Chechnya and perhaps also to the 1999 series of apartment building bombings in 
Moscow that killed approximately 300 people.133   
Soon after Russia pledged its support for the war against international terrorism, 
Western criticisms of Russia’s actions in Chechnya were silenced.  However, as months 
passed, many Western European officials resumed their criticism of Putin’s handling of 
the Chechnya crisis.  This criticism was, again, silenced after the 23 October 2002 crisis 
in Moscow in which “50 heavily armed Chechen fighters took around 800 people hostage 
in a Moscow theater…When the crisis ended three days later, at least 118 hostages were 
dead.”134  Less than three weeks later, Russia Weekly reported that, “According to NATO 
Secretary General George Robertson, it is getting more and more clear that terrorists are 
operating on the territory of Chechnya and that international terrorists are being trained 
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there.”135  In an exclusive interview with President Bush on the eve of the NATO 
Summit in Prague, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty asked the question: “Russian 
President Vladimir Putin has equated his war in Chechnya with the U.S. war on 
terrorism.  Do you agree with that equation, or do you still feel – as was stated during 
your election campaign – that Russian forces are committing brutalities against innocent 
Chechen civilians?”136  President Bush refused to harshly criticize Putin’s actions in 
Chechnya.  He answered, “I think that, or hope that, Russia should be able to solve their 
issue with Chechnya peacefully.  That is not to say that Vladimir [Putin] shouldn’t do 
what it takes to protect his people from individual terrorist attacks.”137   
Another motive behind Russia’s desire for better relations with the West may be 
its interest in improving its economic performance.  As Celeste A. Wallander has 
observed, “Putin has a broader and longer term agenda, which is not really about NATO 
and its details.  Putin’s objective is Russia’s economic development, and its integration 
into the global financial and trade system.”138  According to Vladimir Baranovsky, a 
fundamental factor promoting Russia’s relations with Europe has been “Russia’s interest 
in economic links with Europe… [This is] due both to the imperatives of domestic 
reforms and to a desire to obtain better positions in the world market.”139  Mark A. Smith 
of the Conflict Studies Research Centre has reported that, “on 28 September [2001], US 
Trade Secretary Robert Zoellick said that there was an opportunity to reassess Russo-US 
relations, and that the USA would speed up its analysis of Russia’s appeal to be accorded 
market economy status.  Although he denied that rules would be eased for Russia’s 
application to join the WTO [World Trade Organization], he anticipated that there would 
be rapid progress in WTO talks.”140  By supporting the war against terrorism Putin has 
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been able to gain economic benefits for the Russian Federation.  According to Sergei 
Blagov, Russia’s cooperation in the war on terrorism “secured US backing for Moscow’s 
efforts to join the World Trade Organization, and Russia received full membership in the 
G8 group of the industrialized nations.”141  On 6 June 2002, the United States awarded 
Russia market economy status.  “The U.S. market economy designation follows by a 
week a similar announcement from the 15-nation European Union.”142  According to 
Martin Crutsinger, “The decision, which was made by the Commerce Department’s 
Import Administration, represented a further step in Bush’s campaign to strengthen 
economic ties, symbolizing that relations between the United States and its former Cold 
War foe have entered a new era.  For his part, Putin has actively pursued closer ties with 
the West as a way to bolster his country’s efforts to recover from 70 years of communist 
central planning and lift the country’s economic fortunes.  He also viewed the designation 
as a reward for Russia’s support since Sept. 11 of the U.S.-led war against terrorists.”143  
In addition to securing economic benefits, Moscow’s post-11 September actions have 
elevated Russia’s political status within NATO, Europe, and the international arena. 
According to Vladimir Baranovsky, political interactions in Europe are essential 
to maintain Russia’s respectable international status.144  These interactions will take 
place primarily with NATO and the European Union.  According to Willem Matser, a 
Dutch expert with the Office of the NATO Secretary General’s Special Advisor for 
Central and Eastern Europe, “Russia’s principal objective has not changed.  It still wants, 
above all, to be treated as a mature, influential partner and to have a voice in the key 
Euro-Atlantic security institutions and in defence and security decisionmaking.”145  Chris 
Patten, the European Union Commissioner for External Relations, has stated, “The 
European Union believes…that the NATO-Russia agreement to create NATO at 20 will 
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provide a fresh impetus to Russia’s role in strengthening European security.”146  In the 
view of Paul Fritch, an expert on NATO-Russia issues in NATO’s Political Affairs 
Division, “President Putin has pursued consistently his vision of Russia as a ‘European’ 
power… [and his] ‘Westernist’ strategy envisions genuine cooperation with Western 
Europe and the United States, in order to restore Russia’s political and economic might 
and to face more effectively long-term threats to the south and the east.”147  According to 
Mitchell Orenstein and Dmitri Trenin, the new NATO-Russia Council changes Russia’s 
status in NATO from a “symbolic partnership” to an “associate member.”148  Vladimir 
Shlapentokh has suggested that, “In the future, Putin may take steps – some serious, some 
symbolic – to show the world and his own people that Russia still plays an important role 
in the international arena.”149 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze the origins of the NATO-Russia 
Council.  The chapter has examined Russia’s relations with the West when Vladimir 
Putin became the acting President of Russia on 31 December 1999 and how the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States led to a new era of 
cooperation.  The chapter has examined the apparent motives of British Prime Minister 
Blair, of the NATO nations collectively, and of President Putin and the Russian 
Federation.  Several motives help to explain why each of the parties has pursued and 
embraced a new NATO-Russia relationship.  None of these motives is solely responsible 
for the establishment of better relations between the Allies and Russia; however, they 
have together contributed to a better relationship and to the eventual establishment of the 
NATO-Russia Council. 
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IV. THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL 
A. REVIEW OF THE FOUNDING ACT 
On 27 May 1997, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
Russian Federation approved the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security.  After several years of unsuccessful attempts, NATO and Russia formalized 
their new relationship and made a commitment to “build together a lasting and inclusive 
peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative 
security.”150  The Founding Act “reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to 
give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and 
undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples.”151  Leaders from both 
sides praised the Act and looked forward to a strategic relationship that would build upon 
the “practical cooperation” between NATO and Russian troops serving side-by-side in 
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.152   
In an article published two days before the signing of the document, NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana described the Founding Act as “a quantum leap…[that] 
sets the seal on a permanent and close working partnership…[T]he Founding Act 
represents a strategic gain for the whole of the European continent.”153  At the signing 
ceremony of the Founding Act, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated, “Europe is 
undergoing a time of deep transitions.  What is being created is a foundation for a new 
type of relations among states.  We are determining the face of the future European 
environment, and the decisions being taken at this time will determine which way and 
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how our continent will enter the next 21st Century.”154  After the Heads of State and 
Government made their speeches and signed the Founding Act, Secretary General Solana 
concluded with the following remarks: “Our signatures have just sealed a historic 
document.  These pages will, that is our sincere hope, form a bridge towards a new 
relationship between NATO and Russia that leaves behind the vicissitudes of the past and 
looks towards the future.  Let us walk together.”155  In addition to the hopes expressed 
about how the relationship would lead to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, the 
Founding Act also specified that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council would be 
the forum for interaction. 
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL  
According to the Founding Act, “The Permanent Joint Council will provide a 
mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where 
appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common 
concern.”156  Secretary General Solana described in May 1997 how the PJC was 
expected to facilitate the cooperation between Russia and the Alliance:  
The mechanisms of the new relationship are truly innovative…The 
consultations will cover a broad range of political or security related 
matters.  Based on these consultations, the Joint Council will develop joint 
initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in 
parallel.  Once consensus has been reached, it will make joint decisions, if 
appropriate, and take joint action on a case-by-case basis…When 
consensus is not possible, both sides will of course remain free to take 
decisions and actions on their own.157 
Although the PJC lasted only five years and was eventually replaced by the 
NATO-Russia Council, it did have some merit.  According to a June 2002 NATO Fact 
Sheet, “The Permanent Joint Council was established as a forum for regular consultation 
on common security issues.  Over the next five years, a substantial programme of 
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practical security and defence-related cooperation was developed and much progress was 
made in building mutual confidence and overcoming misperceptions through dialogue, in 
spite of differences over the Kosovo air campaign that led to a year-long interruption in 
the PJC’s activities.”158 
A. V. Grushko, the Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s All-
European Cooperation Department, offers in retrospect a similar positive assessment of 
the PJC.  According to Grushko,  
The “deep freeze” of the links with the Alliance in the wake of the 
Yugoslav crisis, however, enabled the parties to pause for breath and take 
a new look at the basic approaches to the building of their mutual 
relations.  The food for reflections was there.  The Russia-NATO 
Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) created on its own 
basis had been in existence for about two years.  A certain culture and 
habits of political dialogue had taken shape.  Some concrete projects had 
been launched.  As a result both we and NATO came to understand each 
other’s behavior better.  The activities of NATO and its internal workings 
had become transparent for us.159 
In practice, however, as time passed, inherent problems with the PJC’s structure 
and mechanics led to its ineffectiveness.  DR A. (Anonymous), an expert on NATO-
Russia relations, offered the following analysis in an article in 2001: “The Founding Act 
and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council might have illustrated the state of 
NATO-Russian relations at the time of negotiations and probably was the best solution 
available at the time.  The framework has since shown its limits.”160  In the words of 
Peter Trenin-Straussov, Founder and Director of the Moscow School of Political Studies, 
“the PJC was becoming less, rather than more relevant over time.”161 
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C. THE BUILDING OF A NEW NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP   
Leaders in Russia and the Alliance member states also recognized the 
shortcomings of the dialogue and cooperation in the PJC framework and sought ways to 
improve the relationship.  The combined struggle against terrorism became the basis for 
improved relations.  After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United 
States, leaders from Russia and the West seized the opportunity to improve NATO-
Russia relations.  According to Grushko, “As early as September 13 the Russia-NATO 
PJC issued a strong statement condemning the barbaric acts of terrorism. It contained an 
expression of readiness for joint struggle.  And a month later a concrete program of 
interaction in this sphere saw the light of day.”162  At the 7 December 2001 meeting of 
the PJC at the level of Foreign Ministers, Russia and the Allies stated that 
Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship between NATO 
Allies and Russia, enhancing our ability to work together in areas of 
common interest and to stand up to new threats and risks to our 
security…We have decided to give new impetus and substance to our 
partnership, with the goal of creating a new council bringing together 
NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for 
joint action at 20.163   
According to Grushko, “A strict deadline for this work was set – it had to be 
finished before the new meeting of the foreign ministers in Reykjavik [Iceland] in May 
2002…After inter-agency consultations, the Russian side submitted a draft document on 
a new quality of Russia-NATO relationships to all NATO member states in February of 
this year [2002].  The document combined all of the previously reached understandings 
regarding a new nature of relations and was a follow-up to the ministerial decisions of 
December 7.”164   
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Russian officials lobbied for several key principles that they wanted to be the 
basis for the functioning of the new NATO-Russia Council.165  According to Grushko, 
the Russians named the following principles:  
unconditional compliance with international law, the UN Charter and the 
Helsinki Final Act; the focus on agreeing joint approaches, working out 
joint decisions, and determining joint actions on the basis of a systemic 
political dialogue covering a wide range of security issues; commitment to 
consensus; rejection of unilateral actions that run counter to joint 
decisions.  It was fundamentally important that the Russian document 
spelled out the formula of “twenty”:  for example, it said that Russia and 
NATO countries would pledge to act in their “national capacity” in the 
new body, not by the obsolete “19+1” formula.166 
The draft document underwent several revisions in a number of complex but 
constructive negotiation sessions.167   
Nearly all of Moscow’s principles were incorporated in the signed 28 May 2002 
Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian 
Federation on NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality.  Two Russian principles –  
“unconditional compliance with international law, the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final 
Act; …[and] rejection of unilateral actions that run counter to joint decisions” – were 
absent from the final document.168  It can be argued that NATO’s unilateral military 
intervention in the 1999 Kosovo crisis, without explicit UN Security Council 
authorization, motivated Russia’s proposal to include these principles.  If the Russians 
had successfully incorporated these principles into the Declaration, they could have 
constrained the Alliance and improved their ability to influence international affairs.   
At the 14 May 2002 Ministerial Meeting of the PJC, both sides approved a final 
draft document and recommended that the heads of State and Government sign the 
declaration.169  In the final Declaration, NATO and Russia agreed to “observe in good 
faith our obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and 
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principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European 
Security.”170  However, as noted earlier, there is no mention of the Moscow-proposed 
principle:  “rejection of unilateral actions that run counter to joint decisions.”171 
D. THE ROME DECLARATION 
On 28 May 2002, five years and a day after the signing of the Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, 
the leaders of the Alliance’s nineteen members and Russia gathered in Rome for a 
summit.  The Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian 
Federation signed a Declaration titled “NATO-Russia Relations:  A New Quality.”172   
Leaders of the Alliance praised the new relationship.  For example, Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated, “ I sincerely believe that this bond [the Declaration on 
NATO-Russia Relations:  A New Quality] will be a decisive one for history and for 
world security.”173  President George W. Bush also praised the new relationship 
embodied in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).  According to his address, “Today marks 
an historic achievement for a great alliance and a great European nation.  Two former 
foes are now joined as partners, overcoming fifty years of division and a decade of 
uncertainty.  And this partnership takes us closer to an even larger goal:  a Europe that is 
whole, free and at peace.”174  The other Heads of State and Government of the North 
Atlantic Alliance all voiced their satisfaction with the new NATO-Russia relationship.   
NATO Secretary General Robertson also praised this historic event, but he 
cautioned that this was just the beginning: “[T]here will be high expectations of all.  
Expectations that this will not be just another glitzy protocol event, but a real 
                                                 
170 NATO, “NATO Russia Relations: A New Quality,” Declaration by Heads of State and 
Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, Rome, Italy, 28 May 2002.  
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b020528e.htm.  Accessed August 2002. 
171 A. V. Grushko, “Russia-NATO Twenty Appears to Be Working.” 
172 NATO, “NATO Russia Relations: A New Quality.”  
173 Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister of Italy, Address given at the Summit Meeting of NATO and 
Russia at the level of Heads of State and Government, Rome, Italy, 28 May 2002, p. 15, (Contained in the 
compilation of the speeches delivered and the text of the Rome Declaration itself) 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/0205-rome.htm.  Accessed March 2003. 
174 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Address given at the Summit Meeting 
of NATO and Russia at the level of Heads of State and Government, Rome, Italy, 28 May 2002, p. 19 
(Contained in the compilation of the speeches delivered and the text of the Rome Declaration itself) 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/0205-rome.htm.  Accessed March 2003. 
48 
breakthrough.  Expectations that the new NATO-Russia Council will not just talk but will 
act, not just analyse but prescribe, not just deliberate but take decisive action.  We have a 
profound obligation to ensure that these expectations are not disappointed.”175   
Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation also praised the 
Declaration on a New Quality of Relations.  At the Rome Summit Meeting of the NATO-
Russia Council on 28 May 2002 President Putin said:   
It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of the Summit.  Even 
quite recently, this kind of meeting between leaders of Russia and the 
NATO member nations, given the format and quality it has today, would 
have been simply unthinkable.  It has now become a reality – one which is 
possible thanks to intensive work and the willingness to engage in lively 
and open dialogue…We have come a long way – from opposition to 
dialogue, from confrontation to cooperation.  And we fully understand that 
the signing of the Rome Declaration is only the beginning of building 
fundamentally different relations.176 
E. COMMENTARY ON THE ROME DECLARATION 
In the weeks following the momentous event in Rome, journalists began reporting 
on the different views of the Rome Declaration and the details of the new NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC).  In August 2002, Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Trubnikov declared that “The NATO-Russia Council has all the prerequisites to become 
an efficient tool of cooperation in concrete spheres of the antiterrorist fight, including the 
prevention of terrorist acts committed with the use of mass destruction weaponry 
components and the liquidation of their aftermath.”177  Negative opinions of the NATO-
Russia Council were also expressed in Russia, however. 
Mark Galeotti reported that “A commentary in the influential centrist-nationalist 
newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta said that ‘Russia’s relations with the alliance, even in 
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the format of the ‘20’, look like a sham.’  Others were even more strident:  the Gazeta.ru 
website claimed that ‘Russia capitulates to NATO’ in a piece apparently widely 
circulated within the General Staff and even, according to one officer who spoke to JIR 
[Jane’s Intelligence Review], for a while displayed in several offices of the General Staff 
building itself.”178  According to Francesca Mereu,  
[Vyacheslav] Nikonov of the Politika Foundation also criticized the new 
NATO-Russia Council, saying Moscow won’t be given either decision-
making powers or the ability to influence future events…“In my opinion, 
the [NATO-Russia Council, or the so-called] ‘20 Formula’ is a good deal, 
but so far it is just a piece of paper.  I have to admit that I’m a NATO 
skeptic, and I don’t believe something good will result from the NATO-
Russia Council.  This [council] means that Russia will be given the 
possibility to make decisions concerning antiterrorist operations and issues 
on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  But it is evident that 
antiterrorism and nonproliferation are not the main problems for European 
security.  Important problems will be discussed at another table without 
the participation of Russia.”179 
Political analysts also expressed views on the prospects for the new NATO-
Russia Council.  According to Alexander Golts, 
The honeymoon between Russia and NATO isn’t even over yet, but the 
bride and groom already seem to have lost interest in each other.  Just 
three weeks ago, Italian Prime Minister Silvia Berlusconi compared the 
meeting between President Vladimir Putin and the 19 NATO country 
leaders with the way Aeneas came from Troy to the banks of the Tiber and 
took the local king’s daughter as his wife, thus uniting East and West.  
Berlusconi called the meeting a ‘world wedding’, and each leader 
considered it a duty to proclaim the end of the division of Europe.  But the 
Russia-NATO Council’s first working session in Brussels a week 
later…showed little had changed.  Even before the meeting, [Russian 
Defense Minister] Ivanov said he didn’t expect any ‘epoch-making 
decisions’.  He also said Russia does not plan to discuss with the alliance 
issues that could in ‘any way impose restrictions on the development of 
Russia’s armed forces’.  This all confirms that the pompous setting and 
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lofty speeches at the ‘wedding’ in Rome were designed to draw attention 
away from the newlyweds’ more-than-modest dowry.180 
Alexander Golts may have prematurely interpreted Russia’s cautious attitude as a 
sign that there are significant problems in the NRC.   
Other analysts were more optimistic about the relationship and the prospects of 
the NATO-Russia Council.  Paul Fritch, an expert on NATO-Russia issues in NATO’s 
Political Affairs Division, provided one such view.  According to Fritch, 
In the period since the Summit, further NATO-Russia meetings have been 
held at all levels – defence ministers, ambassadors, political advisors, and 
experts.  Four new working groups have been created, and a range of 
expert meetings convened to transform the political message of Rome into 
practical cooperation in key areas…And while we all continue to grapple 
with the rules and procedures of this entirely new structure, the political 
will that has too often in the past been missing from the NATO-Russia 
dialogue is evident at all levels.  We are still in the very early stages of this 
ambitious undertaking, but the prospects for a genuinely new quality in 
NATO-Russia relations are bright.181 
F. COMPARISON OF THE PJC AND THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL 
Examining the Rome Declaration provides insights into the expected new quality 
of NATO-Russia relations.  According to the Rome Declaration, the NATO-Russia 
Council would replace the PJC as the “mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, 
cooperation, joint decision, and joint action…[and] serve as the principal structure and 
venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia.”182   
The Rome Declaration was not designed to replace or discount the Founding Act, 
but to build upon the Act.  According to the Rome Declaration, “As participants of the 
Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, we reaffirm the goals, 
principles  and  commitments  set  forth  therein.”183  Furthermore, the Rome Declaration 
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was intended to establish “a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and the 
Russian Federation” which would contribute to the accomplishment of the goals 
contained in the Founding Act.184   
This “qualitatively new relationship” would be achieved in the venue of the 
NATO-Russia Council.  According to the Rome Declaration, the NRC “will operate on 
the principle of consensus.  It will work on the basis of a continuous political dialogue on 
security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging 
problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions, 
as appropriate.”185  These guiding principles share many similarities with those outlined 
in the Founding Act.   
The meeting schedule of the NATO-Russia Council also resembles that of the 
PJC.  According to the Rome Declaration, “It will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers 
and at the level of Defense Ministers twice annually, and at the level of Heads of State 
and Government as appropriate.  Meetings of the Council at Ambassadorial level will be 
held at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as 
needed…Meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, meetings at 
military representatives level at least once a month.”186   
There is, however, one difference in the meeting schedule of the NATO-Russia 
Council.  The Rome Declaration established a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) “[t]o 
support and prepare the meetings of the Council.”187  According to the Rome 
Declaration, “The Preparatory Committee will meet twice monthly, or more often if 
necessary.”188  The PrepCom consists of representatives from the twenty nations and 
because  it has more frequent meetings than take place at the Ambassadorial level most of 
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the discussion takes place within this committee.189  In addition, the NRC has established 
ad hoc working groups (ADWG) or expert groups to work on specific details of an 
issue.190   
There are other significant differences in the structures of the PJC and the NRC.  
According to the Rome Declaration, the NRC will  
bring together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue 
opportunities for joint action at twenty…In the framework of the NATO-
Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal 
partners in areas of common interest…The members of the NATO-Russia 
Council, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with 
their respective collective commitments and obligations, will take joint 
decisions and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for 
their implementation.191 
According to Mark Galeotti, “The new NATO-Russia Council represents a real 
step forward from its predecessor, the Permanent Joint Council, which was established in 
1997 to institutionalise meetings between NATO members and Russia on a ‘16 + 1’ basis 
(later ‘19 + 1’) but which became little more than a forum for public declarations.  Given 
that the NATO powers approached meetings having already decided their line in 
advance, Moscow came to characterise it as ‘19-versus-1’.”192   
Alexander Golts offers the following explanation of the key difference between 
the NRC and the PJC: “The new NATO council is supposed to lay the foundation for a 
new kind of cooperation and the Rome declaration states that participants in council 
meetings will act in their national capacity.  This implies that discussions on the issues 
the new body is to address will start from scratch, without NATO states first working out 
a common position.”193  Although the NRC begins discussions without a pre-coordinated 
NATO position, the members of the Alliance decide which issues will go to the NATO-
Russia Council.   
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According to an expert on NATO-Russia relations: 
All projects must be approved by [the] Allies first before they can be 
submitted for debate/consideration in the NRC.  But this does not mean 
that all of the details are worked out by [the] Allies first…So, there are 
still debates that are decided “at 20,” which is different from the PJC when 
Allies had their decisions firmed up before they would address it with 
Russia.  In the PJC, there was no such thing as “working out the details 
with Russia” because the details were pre-determined.194 
Each of the NATO members and Russia can make a proposal for consideration 
within the NRC.  However, the 19 members of the Alliance then meet in the Political 
Committee, of which Russia is not a member, to decide if this is an issue that they want 
to discuss with Russia in the NRC.195  Moreover, each NATO member retains the ability 
to withdraw any item from discussion with Russia in the NRC.196  According to Susan 
Glasser of the Washington Post, “some NATO members…expressed concern that Russia 
would be given too prominent a role…Eventually, NATO decided on a ‘safeguard’ 
provision, allowing any member to withdraw an item from the council’s agenda and refer 
it to the NATO governing council, to which Russia does not belong.”197    According to 
an expert on NATO-Russia relations, if an Ally begins to see the discussions “heading in 
an undesirable direction,” it can remove the issue from the NRC for discussion among 
only the Allies.198  Although the safeguard exists, “it has yet to be exercised.”199   
Another procedural difference between the PJC and the NRC is that “The NATO-
Russia Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO.”200  This is in 
contrast to the PJC, which was “chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a 
representative of one of the NATO member States on a rotation basis, and a 
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representative of Russia.”201  According to Peter Trenin-Straussov, “This elaborate 
‘troika’ scheme reflected a difficult compromise, but for many Russians it suggested that 
NATO would have a 2:1 majority on procedural matters.”202  This new format of the 
NRC’s chair is expected to eliminate this perception of biased leadership even though it 
could be construed by Russian critics of the NATO-Russian Council as awarding 
complete control over procedural matters to NATO. 
According to the Rome Declaration, “The NATO-Russia Council, replacing the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, will focus on all areas of mutual interest 
identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision to add other areas 
by mutual agreement…NATO member states and Russia will continue to intensify their 
cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-
proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, 
search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.”203   
In May 2002 Robert E. Hunter and Sergey M. Rogov suggested a strategy for the 
NATO-Russia Council.  According to Hunter and Rogov. “The trick is for both sides to 
focus more on what they do than on how they do it.  This means not reaching for the 
moon at first…And it means starting small, one careful step at a time.”204  Hunter and 
Rogov listed a number of possible areas in which the NATO-Russia Council could focus, 
such as cooperating in civil emergency planning; conducting joint military exercises that 
include Russia; stationing Russian officers at NATO military headquarters and NATO 
officers at Russian headquarters; and, creating a counter-terrorism information sharing 
center.205   
When the NATO-Russia Council was established it continued discussions on the 
topics that were contained in the 2002 work programs for the PJC.  According to a 6 June 
2002 statement by the Defense Ministers of the NATO-Russia Council, “We are strongly 
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committed to the implementation of the NRC Work Programme for 2002…and have 
given directions to our Ambassadors to take this work forward.”206  In this statement, 
they assigned over a dozen specific tasks under the following broad headings:  “Struggle 
Against Terrorism,” “Crisis Management,” “Non-Proliferation,” “Arms Control and 
Confidence-Building Measures,” “Theatre Missile Defence,” “Search and Rescue at 
Sea,” and “Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defense Reform.”207 
G. THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL’S REPORTED PROGRESS TO DATE 
Since its inception, the NATO-Russia Council has apparently achieved genuine 
success.  The area which has seen the most accomplishments is the Struggle Against 
Terrorism.  According to NATO Secretary General Robertson, “The work on terrorism is 
at the very heart of the work that NATO and Russia are doing together.”208  Since the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, NATO and Russia have 
conducted two conferences “focusing on the role of the military in combatting 
terrorism.”209  The first conference took place on 4 February 2002 and the more recent 
one took place on 9 December 2002, the latter under the auspices of the NATO-Russia 
Council.  According to Lord Robertson, “NATO and Russia are now sharing intelligence 
and intelligence assessments of areas like the Balkans.  We are debating and discussing 
how our military capabilities can be reshaped so that we can deal better with combating 
terrorism.  And we are seeking to discover all the time new ways in which we can co-
operate to deal with this greatest menace of the 21st century.”210  Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, in a message to the participants of the Conference On the Military’s Role 
in Combating Terrorism, stated:   
I am convinced that Russia and NATO have the potential for cooperation 
in the new security conditions.  It has been this common understanding of 
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the need for joint actions that has made it possible to alter the quality of 
the Russia-NATO relationship.  It is of fundamental importance that the 
antiterrorist sphere is now part and parcel of our increasingly strong 
cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance.211 
Although the struggle against international terrorism is the primary topic on the 
NATO-Russia agenda, the NATO-Russia Council has made progress in other areas.   
During September 2002, the NATO-Russia Council sponsored a three-day field 
exercise called “Bogorodsk 2002” to test their response to a terrorist act against a 
chemically hazardous production facility.212  According to a Press Release from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Russia believes that the joint 
exercise under the aegis of the Russia-NATO council will constitute an important 
contribution to combining efforts of the international community in the area of civil 
emergency response and will help to build on the potential of Russia-NATO equal 
cooperation in fields of mutual interest.”213   
NATO and Russia have also made progress in defence reform.  According to a 
NATO statement, “A joint NATO-Russia conference entitled ‘NATO-Russia Council and 
Defence Reform’ was held on 10 October 2002 at the NATO Defense College in Rome.  
The conference focused on a range of issues related to defense reform experiences in 
Russia and NATO member countries.  Topics of discussion included:  requirements for 
armed forces, management of change, conduct and implementation of strategic defence 
reviews, as well as concrete projects for NATO-Russia cooperation.”214  According to a 
keynote address by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alessandro Minuto 
Rizzo, 
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NATO-Russia cooperation on defence reform is an exercise in 
transparency and openness.  An exercise in putting problems on the table, 
and examining how we can learn from each other.  An exercise in sharing 
our experiences, our expectations, perhaps even our frustrations.  And an 
exercise, therefore, in building confidence between us, and in promoting 
the interoperability of our forces and strengthening the NATO-Russia 
relationship.215 
In addition to the conferences, dialogue, and military exercises, NATO and Russia 
have reached agreements and made joint decisions on cooperation.  According to Lord 
Robertson, “Today, [20 September 2002] less than four months after its creation, the 
NATO-Russia Council at Ambassadorial level reached agreement on Political Aspects of 
a Generic Concept of Joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations…This decision 
constitutes a milestone in NATO-Russia cooperation within the new NRC framework, 
and a further contribution to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”216   
Another significant accomplishment of the NATO-Russia Council is its landmark 
agreement on mutual help and co-operation in submarine crew search and rescue at 
sea.217  According to the agreement, “NATO and Russia will work to standardise search 
and rescue procedures, collaborate in developing the necessary equipment, exchange 
relevant information and conduct joint exercises.”218  NATO Secretary General 
Robertson declared that “Submarine search and rescue is a fine example of what our 
relationship really means.”219  The NRC venue was not the reason why Russia and the 
Allies were able to reach a consensus.220  Much of the negotiations took place under the 
auspices of the PJC; however, little progress was made toward an agreement.221  
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Moreover, the nature of the agreement had changed over time.222  According to an expert 
on NATO-Russia relations, “There was the realization that we wouldn’t get an agreement 
unless the document became a very short one.  So, it would not be fair to say that the 
venue was the deciding factor.  Rather, the Russians had to change what they were 
expecting in the way of an agreement.”223         
The NATO-Russia Council has made progress in other areas.  According to a 
statement by the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, in his capacity as Chairman 
of the NATO-Russia Council, “Today, Foreign Ministers of the NATO-Russia 
Council…welcomed in particular progress achieved in intensifying cooperation…in 
theatre missile defence, where an ambitious work programme has set forth a road to 
interoperability of Allied and Russian systems.”224  In addition, the NATO-Russia 
Council Foreign Ministers welcomed the progress achieved “in crisis management, where 
NRC Ambassadors agreed on a political framework to take work forward on future 
NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations, and where progress was made in the dialogue on 
ways to enhance border security in the Balkans.”225   
The NATO-Russia Council is also moving forward in non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  According to Lord Robertson, “NRC proliferation 
experts are examining ways to keep WMD and ballistic missile technology out of the 
hands of terrorists.”226  In a 22 November 2002 NATO-Russia Council review of the first 
six months, Foreign Ministers of the NRC applauded the work “in non-proliferation, 
where work is underway for a joint assessment of global trends in the proliferation of 
NBC [Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical] agents and their means of delivery.”227  
 The progress over the past nine months has silenced nearly all of the 
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by Cold War attitudes, remain skeptical of NATO.  Vladimir Isachenkov of the Moscow 
Times has reported that “The Russian government’s critics dismiss the new cooperation 
as more show than substance, and warn that NATO remains a political enemy.  ‘NATO is 
a big stick in the hands of the United States, aimed against any nation or regime that 
Washington dislikes’, Communist lawmaker Viktor Ilyukin said.  ‘NATO’s final goal 
toward Russia is to seize its resources’.”228   
Despite these criticisms, key leaders within the Russian government continue to 
applaud the NATO-Russia Council.  According to Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetov, 
Russia’s senior military representative to NATO, 
We now have joint projects to do, and by working together we have come 
to understand each other better…We are becoming more predictable for 
each other, and this is extremely important…Unlike the past, when NATO 
just presented its coordinated view to us, we are now making decisions 
together…The more we work together with NATO, the better we get to 
know each other and the stronger our security will become.229 
At an 11 November 2002 joint press conference following a meeting with 
Secretary General Robertson, President Putin said, “We consider that the potential laid in 
Rome for cooperation within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council is beginning to 
be realized.”230  Following the 22 November 2002 meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said, “Half a year has not yet passed since the 
meeting of the heads of state and government of Russia and NATO in Rome.  But one 
can already say with confidence now that the council at 20 is becoming an effective 
instrument of cooperation and joint activity.”231   
                                                 
228 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Warmer Ties Quell Fears Over NATO,” Moscow Times, 21 November 
2002, p. 1.  
229 Ibid. 
230 Vladimir Putin, “Russian President Vladimir Putin Remarks and Answers to Questions at Joint 
Press Opportunity Following Meeting with George Robertson, Brussels,” Daily News Bulletin, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, 11 November 2002.  
http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/EA66AF40B736D55043256C71004B484F?OpenDocument.  Accessed 
March 2003 
231 Igor Ivanov, “Transcript of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Remarks at Press 
Conference Following Russia-NATO Council Meeting (Prague, November 22, 2002),”Daily News 
Bulletin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, 
Document # 2421-23-11-2002.  
http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/C33114E870EA4C3743256C7C00323B81?OpenDocument.  Accessed 
March 2003. 
60 
Western leaders have also praised the work of the NATO-Russia Council.  Lord 
Robertson, NATO’s Secretary General and Chairman of the NATO-Russia Council¸ has 
applauded the progress of the Council.  In November 2002 “Lord Robertson also said that 
all the members of the NATO-Russia Council ‘can be proud’ that it had succeeded in 
converting the pledges and promises made at the May 2002 NATO-Russia Summit into 
concrete decisions and activities in areas ranging from peacekeeping in the Balkans, 
missile defence to search and rescue at sea and defence reform.”232  In an article first 
published in Krasnaya Zvezda, a newspaper published by the Russian Ministry of 
Defence, on 10 October 2002, Lord Robertson wrote, “As I write this, NATO-Russia 
cooperation has become the rule rather than the exception…Our partnership is real, and it 
is growing.”233  At a 13 May 2003 press conference following the meeting of the NATO-
Russia Council, NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, provided comments on the 
progress to date.  According to Lord Robertson, 
Substantial progress has been made in moving towards practical co-
operation in most areas…which were identified in the joint declaration in 
Rome…Some people will believe that this list that I have read out is dry, 
maybe even boring.  There will be people who will wonder what some of 
the technical jargon means and to some, perhaps ordinary, people in the 
populations of the 20 countries in the NATO-Russia Council, it will 
appear so technical that it’s not relevant.  But I make the point, as the 
Chairman of the NATO-Russia Council, that this is an agenda of solid, 
concrete, and productive co-operation…So this is an agenda for change, 
an agenda for reform, an agenda for co-operation, which we can be 
justifiably proud of and is a clear signal of where we intend to go in the 
future.234 
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H. VISIBLE AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF THE NATO-RUSSIA 
COUNCIL 
Nearly all of the official statements from Moscow, NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels and Alliance governments speak positively about the NATO-Russia Council.  
However, this does not mean that there are no problems and disagreements within the 
Council.  According to an American expert who follows NATO-Russia relations, “Of 
course problems exist in the NRC.”235  This expert suggests that the problems are not 
publicized for two reasons: first, U.S. leaders have not been questioned by Congress or 
the media about NATO-Russia relations; second, nearly all the participating nations 
believe in the NRC and want it to be successful.236  Moreover, there is a natural tendency 
for both sides to accentuate the positive aspects while downplaying the negative ones.237   
According to another Washington-based analyst, “undoubtedly there are problems 
with the NATO-Russia Council that have not been publicized.”238  This analyst indicates 
that one such possible problem may be the “general lack of deliverables” from the 
NRC.239  However, a lack of concrete accomplishments to date should not be a major 
concern and in no way proves that the NRC is headed down a path towards failure.  
Dialogue and cooperation may well lead to a more mature relationship capable of 
tolerating differing views and opinions.  Secretary General Lord Robertson holds that the 
NATO-Russian relationship has reached a certain level of maturity.  According to Lord 
Robertson, 
I think that the existence of the NATO-Russia Council has prevented 
differences over Iraq from becoming a crisis, like the NATO-Russia 
relationship suffered during Kosovo in 1999.  It has brought about a new 
maturity…And I think that that is a very good sign for the future of the 
international community that NATO nations and Russia can now have 
established a working relationship of such durability that it can survive 
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and move on from even passionately held differences of opinion, like the 
one that recently took place on Iraq.240 
Dialogue and cooperation between Russia and the Alliance in areas of mutual 
interest may represent small but natural steps in the building of a more meaningful 
relationship based on trust.  Robert Hunter and Sergey Rogov have pointed out that “The 
importance of this type of effort [that is, beginning with small steps in optimal areas] is 
not its modesty but its practicality, its potential for building the mutual trust to turn 
common interests into common action.  This is the stuff that will validate the grand hopes 
that have emerged in Russia’s relations with the West since Sept. 11.  Done carefully, 
deliberately and with wisdom about both problems and possibilities, this can lead to a 
dramatic reshaping of Eurasian security.”241   
There are also potential problems that may arise in the NATO-Russia Council.  
Some analysts believe that problems are likely to surface as soon as the NATO-Russia 
Council is confronted with a tough issue about which Russia and the NATO Allies have 
sharply different opinions.  Moreover, at this writing, in May 2003, the NATO-Russia 
Council has been in existence for only a year, and it is still benefiting from the post-11 
September convictions regarding a shared struggle against terrorism.  As time passes and 
the memories of 11 September 2001 fade, the shared convictions may wither, leaving the 
NRC more vulnerable to differences in opinion.   
Another potential problem within the NATO-Russia Council resides in the 
safeguard measures.  According to Robert Hunter and Sergey Rogov, “Still, the new 
NATO-Russia Council is surrounded by so-called safeguards that make it not much better 
than the old council.  NATO allies have to agree before any item goes on the agenda; 
both NATO and Russia retain the right to act separately on any item; any NATO ally, on 
its own, can pull an item off the agenda.”242   
Up to this point, the NATO Allies have never exercised the option of pulling an 
Council “at 20” back to the “NATO only” North Atlantic issue from the NATO-Russia 
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Council forum.  If this does occur, Russia’s reaction might be influenced by various 
circumstantial factors.  However, it is possible that such actions by NATO would lead 
Moscow to become more skeptical of NATO’s intentions.   
If the Allies came to the NATO-Russia Council with a pre-determined position at 
some point, that could also disrupt the relationship.  According to the House of Commons 
Defence Committee report, The Future of NATO, “The developments in NATO-Russia 
relations, particularly since 11 September, have been exciting and promise a great 
deal…Despite the disappointment of the PJC, NATO is right to take this opportunity to 
test Russia’s willingness to engage constructively in important common security issues.  
And, correspondingly, NATO should be wary of giving the impression of any ‘pre-
cooking’ of decisions.”243  According to an expert observer, “[T]here are some issues that 
Allies have determined will be pre-coordinated before approaching Russia.  These issues 
are not written in stone, but all Allies know that they are there.”244  This observer opines 
that proliferation issues and peacekeeping operations are two topic areas in which the 
Allies may want to “manage things” by approaching Russia with a “pre-coordinated” 
position.245  These examples are, it should be noted, not particularly persuasive in that 
both topic areas are explicitly listed in the May 2002 “New Quality” declaration, and 
NATO and Russia have been cooperating in peacekeeping in the Balkans since December 
1995.    
Problems could also originate from the Russians.  Moscow must move beyond its 
PJC behavior pattern and be willing to devote the resources and exert the political will 
necessary to make the partnership work.  DR A. points out that during the period of the 
PJC, “Russia did not partake in security debates to foster cooperation and build genuine 
partnership.  It adopted a skeptical attitude, combating NATO enlargement and disputing 
the Alliance’s renewed raison ďệtre and new missions.”246  Alexander Golts states that 
“The [Permanent] Joint Council failed when it became clear that on key issues such as 
ws that were the opposite [of] those of NATO states and Yugoslavia, Moscow held vie                                                 
243 Defence Committee, The Future of NATO, The House of Commons, Seventh Report of Session 
2001-02, 24 July 2002, p. 37.  
244 Information provided by an expert on NATO-Russia relations.  20 March 2003. 
245 Information provided by an expert on NATO-Russia relations.  14 April 2003. 
246 DR A. (Anonymous), “Whither NATO-Russia co-operation,” P. 326. 
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tried to sow dissension within the alliance.  And Russian generals would sometimes 
propose topics that NATO members saw as locking them into fruitless discussions…If 
Russian politicians intend to carry on these demonstrations of their own grandeur in the 
future and continue attempts to drive a wedge between the United States and its Western 
European allies, then the new council’s prospects will be no brighter than those of its 
predecessors.”247   
Another potential problem is the possible lack of political will of NATO and 
Russian officials below the ministerial level.  As documented in this thesis, key leaders 
(including heads of state and government) support the NATO-Russia Council.  This vigor 
has also been visible at the ministerial level.  However, Andrew Jack of the Financial 
Times has reported that “A senior US diplomat added that although co-operation was 
‘excellent’ at the ministerial level ‘we have not seen below [that level] an equivalent 
intensity’ among military staff.”248  This also raises the question: What will be the future 
of NATO-Russia cooperation and the NRC after current leaders leave office?  
Speculation on this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, it should be 
viewed as a potential problem. 
Although visible and potential problems confront the NATO-Russia Council, both 
sides must continue to strive to resolve their differences and carry forward dialogue and 
cooperation.  Discussion and cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council are essential in 
building peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.  
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to assess the NATO-Russia Council’s 
prospects.  The chapter has reviewed the Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council.  
The chapter has examined the process of building the new NATO-Russia relationship, 
including the terms of the May 2002 Rome Declaration.  The chapter has compared the 
NATO-Russia Council and the Permanent Joint Council, and has reviewed the reported 
progress to date.  Finally, the chapter has discussed the visible and potential problems of 
the NATO-Russia Council. 
                                                 
247 Alexander Golts, “Russia’s NATO romance seems long over.” 
248 Andrew Jack, “Russia urges wider role for joint forum with Nato,” Financial Times, 14 May 2003, 
p 6. 
65 
Although the NATO-Russia Council has been in existence for only a year, all 
indications suggest that it has enhanced the relationship between Russia and the NATO 
Allies.  NATO and Russia must both continue to display the political will necessary to 
make the NATO-Russia Council work.  Even though few tangible products have to date 
been evident, some analysts believe that the dialogue and cooperation are slowly melting 
away remaining Cold War suspicions.249  This may result in further cooperation and 
agreements on the toughest of issues, including proliferation, military reform, and theater 
missile defense. 
                                                 
249 Information provided by an expert on NATO-Russia relations.  20 March 2003. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
At the end of the Cold War relations between the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation, the principal successor state of the 
former Soviet Union, began to improve.  However, the 1990s also witnessed negative 
Russian reactions to NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s military campaign in the 
Kosovo crisis.  During this period a number of venues were established to promote 
dialogue and cooperation between the Allies and their former adversaries in the Warsaw 
Pact, including the former Soviet republics. 
Russia became a member of NATO’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP), but interaction in these venues did not fully 
achieve the desired goals and expectations of each party.  However, Russia’s political 
involvement in the Bosnia Contact Group and military participation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the follow-on Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) proved to be more successful.  Despite these achievements, the changing 
political landscape in Europe combined with the violence in the Balkans to reinforce the 
need for increased cooperation with Russia in order to bring greater security and stability 
in the Euro-Atlantic area.  The Alliance realized that it needed to establish a special 
relationship with the other major power on the European continent ─ Russia. 
In May 1997, NATO and Russia formalized their special relationship with the 
endorsement of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security.  The 
Founding Act was a non-binding political declaration in which both sides pledged to 
work together to promote peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.  At the heart of 
the Founding Act was the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).  
The PJC was designed to be the venue in which Russia and the Allies would meet to 
discuss, coordinate, and if appropriate, decide and act on a number of broad issues that 
relate to European security.  The PJC lasted for five years (1997-2002).  Although there 
were some accomplishments, the PJC failed to achieve the results desired by its 
architects.  Both Russia and NATO contributed to the PJC’s shortcomings.  Russia’s 
initial decision not to maintain a permanent presence at NATO headquarters contributed 
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to the inadequacy of the PJC.  This stymied Russia’s ability to participate in the daily 
operations of the Permanent Joint Council.  The choice by the Allies to pre-coordinate 
their positions before discussions began with Russia also undermined the PJC’s 
effectiveness, because this resulted in a confrontational “19 versus 1” format instead of 
the “19 plus 1” format envisioned in the Founding Act.  The PJC’s failure to formulate a 
joint solution in response to crisis in Kosovo led to Russia suspending its participation in 
the PJC in response to NATO’s March-June 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia.   
After the NATO air campaign ended, Moscow returned to the PJC but limited the 
agenda to the Balkan peacekeeping operations of SFOR and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).  
At the beginning of January 2000, the new leaders in NATO and Russia agreed to 
establish better relations.  In February 2000, the NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Robertson, and Russia’s acting President, Vladimir Putin, met in Moscow and issued a 
joint statement in which they pledged to increase dialogue and cooperation in the 
Permanent Joint Council.  Over the next year and a half the relationship gradually 
improved.  However, it was Russia’s response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
against the United States that elevated the relationship to a higher level.  Russia’s support 
to the United States and its participation in the coalition against international terrorism 
became the basis for the new relationship.  Over the next several months, key leaders in 
NATO and Russia took actions to build upon this newly discovered partnership. 
The central figure in the building of a stronger NATO-Russia relationship was 
President Putin.  Putin’s foreign policy agenda has been focused on better relations with 
the West.  Despite some opposition from high-ranking government and military officials 
in Russia, Putin initiated the post-11 September 2001 rapprochement and opened the door 
for better NATO-Russian relations.  Western leaders embraced Russia’s initiatives, and 
this led to noteworthy diplomatic movement.   
On 13 November 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin issued a joint statement on a 
new relationship between the United States and Russia.  As a response to Russia’s 
rapprochement with the West and the joint statement by the Presidents of Russia and the 
United States, British Prime Minister Tony Blair initiated discussions about establishing a 
new relationship between Russia and the Alliance.  Blair’s initiative was predicated on 
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the idea that the PJC, with its mixed record, had to be replaced by a new institution and 
that a European could most effectively sell the concept of a new NATO-Russian 
partnership to the European members of the Alliance.  Although the events of 11 
September 2001 marked a turning point in better cooperation between Russia and the 
Allies, each side pursued this improved relationship because of its own motives. 
Various analysts have speculated on the motives of NATO nations in seeking 
better relations with Russia.  Some observers have suggested that the Allies were 
motivated by the desire to mitigate Russia’s opposition to NATO’s next round of 
enlargement.  Some analysts have identified the need to gain Russia’s cooperation in 
combating international terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction as a motive for the Allies to seek a better relationship with Moscow.  Other 
observers have specified additional motives – such as encouraging transparency and 
overcoming remaining Cold War suspicions – to help explain why the Alliance sought 
better relations with Russia.  The Allies may have also embraced better relations with 
Russia because they hope to benefit from Moscow’s diplomatic ties with nations that do 
not have strong ties with the West. 
President Putin and Russia have also had their own motives for improving their 
relations with the Alliance.  Russia has used its support for America’s war on 
international terrorism as a way to gain Western support for its operations in Chechnya.  
Economic benefits in trade and investment constitute another Russian motive for 
improved relations with the West.  In addition to gaining support for its war in Chechnya 
and securing economic benefits, Russia has used its post-11 September actions to elevate 
its political status within the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. 
On 28 May 2002, five years and a day after the adoption of the Founding Act, 
NATO and Russia endorsed a Declaration on “NATO-Russian Relations: A New 
Quality.”  The Rome Declaration was not designed to replace the Founding Act but to 
express the renewed resolve of NATO and Russia to build a lasting peace in the Euro-
Atlantic area.  Moreover, the Rome Declaration established the NATO-Russia Council – 
the new venue to replace the Permanent Joint Council.   
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Since May 2002 the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has been the new forum for 
consultation, cooperation, joint decision and joint action.  The NRC focuses on a number 
of security issues of mutual interest that are identified in the Founding Act.  Although the 
NATO-Russia Council appears at first glance to be similar to the PJC, the fundamental 
difference is that the NRC operates “at twenty.” This means that the Allies and Russia 
will seek a consensus without the NATO countries having previously determined an 
Alliance policy.  Another difference is the establishment of the Preparatory Committee 
(PrepCom) to meet at least twice a month to carry on the NRC’s work and to prepare for 
and support its meetings. 
Like the PJC, the NATO-Russia Council has received its share of criticism.  Some 
hard-line Russian government and military officials have criticized the NRC as evidence 
to support their allegation that Russia has once again “surrendered” to NATO.  These 
critics hold that the “new” relationship will be like the old, in that Moscow will have little 
or no influence on NATO’s decisions.  Some Western critics, unfamiliar with the 
structure and procedures of the NRC, have claimed that this new relationship could give 
Russia a “veto” in the Alliance.250  Other Western critics have claimed that the NRC 
could give Russia too prominent a role in NATO decisions, and that this could result in a 
fracture of the Alliance’s cohesion.   
At the time of this writing, in May 2003, the NATO-Russia Council has been in 
existence for only one year, but its apparent success has silenced nearly all of its critics.  
The NRC has evidently made substantial progress in the struggle against terrorism.  
NATO and Russia have held two conferences on the role of the military in combating 
terrorism and now share some intelligence and intelligence assessments.  The NRC has 
moved beyond dialogue to cooperation.  Within the first eight months of its existence, the 
NRC has reached agreements on political aspects of joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping 
operations and submarine crew search and rescue at sea.  Furthermore, the NRC has 
reportedly made some progress in other areas identified in the Rome Declaration – crisis 
                                                 
250 Examples of these Western critics are cited by Ira Straus, “Whittling down the new Russia-NATO 
set-up,” The Russia Journal, 29 March-4 April 2002.  (contained in the on-line publication Johnson’s 
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management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater 
missile defense, military to military cooperation and defense reform. 
Although nearly all official reports indicate that the NATO-Russia Council has 
been successful, visible and potential problems should be noted.  One visible problem has 
been the lack of concrete accomplishments.  However, two formal agreements were 
reached during the Council’s first year, the agreement on submarine crew search and 
rescue at sea; and, the agreement on political aspects of a generic concept of joint NATO-
Russia peacekeeping operations.  Of the two, the agreement on NATO-Russia 
peacekeeping operations was the only significant accomplishment of the NATO-Russia 
Council.   
Additional problems may arise in the NATO-Russia Council as soon as it is 
confronted with a tough issue about which Russia and the Allies sharply disagree.  Such 
disagreements are more likely to arise after the post-11 September convictions regarding 
a shared struggle against terrorism have faded away.  The safeguard measure that allows 
any member of the Alliance to withdraw an item from the NRC’s agenda for discussion 
among only the Allies could also cause problems in some circumstances.  Moreover, if 
the Allies returned to their practice during the Permanent Joint Council period and came 
to the NATO-Russia Council with a pre-determined position, this could damage the trust 
in the relationship. 
Problems could also originate with the Russians.  For example, if Russia failed to 
devote the resources and to exert the political will necessary to make this partnership 
successful, the NATO-Russia Council would fall victim to the same fate as the PJC.  
Russia as well as NATO must also display the political will that is necessary to make the 
NATO-Russia Council work.   
Although the NATO-Russia Council has been in existence for only a year, the 
available evidence suggests that (despite the visible and potential problems), it has 
enhanced the relationship between Russia and the NATO Allies.  The on-going dialogue 
and cooperation may eventually melt away remaining Cold War suspicions and build 
trust.  If Russia and the Allies can build greater trust and mutual confidence in the 
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NATO-Russia Council, they may be able to sustain a productive relationship despite 
disagreements on particular issues. 
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